

"THE WIGWAM EDITION."

Price]

[25 cts.

THE
LIFE, SPEECHES, AND PUBLIC SERVICES
OF
ABRAM LINCOLN.



LINCOLN.

NEW YORK:
RUDD & CARLETON, 130 GRAND STREET.

CHICAGO: McNALLY & CO.

W. D. 1864.

ORDER THE WIGWAM EDITION.

LINCOLN & HAMLIN.

THE REGULAR CAMPAIGN EDITION,

KNOWN AS

“THE WIGWAM EDITION”

OF

The Life, Speeches, and Public Services

OF

HON. ABRAM LINCOLN,

TOGETHER WITH A LIFE OF

HON. HANNIBAL HAMLIN,

**Republican Candidates for President and Vice
President of the United States.**

One vol. 12mo. Paper covers, with Portrait. Price 25cts.

“THE WIGWAM EDITION.”


From its excellence as a Biography; the evident care in its construction; and the judicious selection of speeches and extracts, the “Wigwam Edition” has already taken precedence among the Lives of Lincoln and Hamlin. The Publishers have spared neither pains nor expense in its preparation, as a glance at its contents will demonstrate.

LIBERAL REDUCTIONS from the retail price of 25 cents, will be made to Booksellers, Agents, and Clubs throughout the country, for these Popular Lives. Particulars, terms, etc., may be learned from

RUDD & CARLETON, Publishers,

130 Grand Street, New York.





LINCOLN.

THE "WIGWAM EDITION."

THE
LIFE, SPEECHES, AND PUBLIC SERVICES
OF
ABRAM LINCOLN,

Together with a Sketch of the Life of
HANNIBAL HAMLIN.

*Republican Candidates for the Offices of President and Vice-
President of the United States.*



NEW YORK:
RUDD & CARLETON, 130 GRAND STREET
(BROOKS BUILDING, COR. OF BROADWAY).

M DCCC LX.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1860, by

RUDD & CARLETON,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern
District of New York.

R. CRAIGHEAD,
Printer, Stereotyper, and Electrotyper,
Carton Building,
81, 83, and 85 Centre Street.

973.7263
226.575
1830 D
LINCOLN Room

THE LIFE OF ABRAM LINCOLN.

IF there is any one peculiarity of American nationality, any phase of American character by which it is distinguished in the eyes of discerning foreigners, any trait that will make it pre-eminent in history, it is that singular sort of energy, half physical and half intellectual, nervous, intense, untiring, which has achieved all of greatness that America has yet attained; it is this that is applied to every aim, that is found in every class in life, that is evident in Morse and Franklin and Webster and Scott; that captures Monterey and searches for the North Pole, that lays Atlantic Telegraphs and subdues the Indian race; that covers a continent with railways, that converts a distant colony into a thriving State in half a dozen years, that has carried this people to its present height of prosperity and power. Now, although this nervous untiring energy is in some sort intellectual, although it implies the possession and the exercise of brain, yet it is as much material as intellectual; it consists in the application of power to matter; it is not ideal but eminently practical; it is like a steam engine, the product, the result of profound and hidden forces, of internal fires, but its action is externally demonstrated; it rides over and under mountains, it bridges rivers, and reaches its aim by trampling upon obstacles: it is not delicate nor dainty, but tremendous and terrible; it is successful. This energy is manifested in various ways and by various characters,

but by none more emphatically than the backwoods-man: the backwoods-man of to-day corresponds to the Puritan of two centuries ago. The same work which the Pilgrim Fathers had to do in New England, is now set for the settlers in Illinois and Wisconsin. This work, whose accomplishment is the wonder of Europe, is the subduing of nature, the civilization of a continent.

The backwoods-man represents this individual trait of American character. Abroad, the backwoods-man is looked upon, and rightly, as the representative American.

Hitherto the backwoods-man has been powerful and important, it is true, but never until now has been conceded to him the first place. Men of experience and culture and training in the arts of polished life have claimed the highest honors in America as abroad. But the natural result of democratic institutions is now accomplished, and a great and powerful party has selected for its standard bearer, one who never received more than six months' schooling, who has not only sprung directly from the people, but who still belongs to the people, who is of them, and among them; who, like Antæus, finds his greatest strength in his contact with that from which he sprang; one whose parents were poor, and who is now not rich, but whose native energies and untutored talents have obtained for him the remarkable recognition which we chronicle. Whatever may be the result of the approaching Presidential election, it will always be distinguished for the elevation of one who had been a working man to such pre-eminence as that accorded to Abram Lincoln. This is a legitimate result of democracy; Lincoln himself in his history and in his character is the true offspring of a democracy. No where else in the world could such things be, and be

normal and natural. A fisherman may be for three days king of Naples, but Massaniello was the child of a revolution; a butcher-boy has in England been prime-minister, but it was the church and the favor of his sovereign that elevated Wolsey; only in America could a man possessing none of the advantages of birth or fortune, or friends or education—achieve so marked success, in the ordinary course of events, and solely by dint of his own energy and industry and ability. Should he be elected President, Abram Lincoln will be the truest illustration and exponent and outcrop of American institutions that those institutions have ever known.

He has revolutionary blood in his veins. The Lincolns of Massachusetts, who are known for their patriotism in the war of '76, were his progenitors. That General Lincoln, who at Yorktown, received from Washington the sword of Cornwallis, was of the same family; but in this country, families are not long powerful or distinguished; they not only rise suddenly from obscurity, but they descend to it again as abruptly. It was so in this instance. Abram Lincoln, the grandfather of him who is now the leader of the Republican party, was originally a quaker of Berks county, Pennsylvania; and in the eastern part of that state, some of his kindred and name may still be found. He early emigrated to Rockingham county, Virginia, where some of his children were born. However, not all the descendants of the old Friend, were destined to be southerners, for in 1782 he, who seems to have been a sort of patriarch, governing the conduct even of his adult and married sons, removed to Hardin county, Kentucky, where he was surprised and killed by Indians while at work on his clearing. His grandson, Abram, was born Feb. 12, 1809: the lad enjoyed lit-

the parental care, for when he was but six years old, his father died, leaving a widow and several children, poor, and almost friendless ; so his entrance into life was under any but apparently favorable auspices ; in the uncleared forests of Kentucky, amid the rude associations of poverty and comparative ignorance ; familiarized with the log-cabin and the rifle, rather than the school-room or the primer ; accustomed to the plow, and to the most ordinary and roughest sorts of labor from his very boyhood. Yet, such influences as these have trained others into men of mark ; have schooled the character and developed the intellects of some whose figure in the world has not been despicable. There are natures for whom such hardening associations are the happiest, and Abram Lincoln seems to have been of these.

The family removed to Spencer county, Indiana, in 1816, but hardly relieved their destitution by this change of abode ; so in 1830, Abram pushed still further west, into Illinois. He was now twenty-one, and had grown to more than the ordinary stature of manhood, his height being six feet and three inches, but his mental faculties had hitherto received no technical training ; opportunities for what is ordinarily styled education, had been utterly without his reach. He had lived, and still lived the life of the laborious poor. He was, by turns, a common farm laborer, a workman in a saw-mill, a splitter of rails, and a flat-boatman on the Wabash and Mississippi rivers—positions, none of them affording remarkable educational advantages. Still, he must have been awake and alive to what opportunities were thrown in his way, and a vigorous mind makes opportunities for itself. That he had a vigorous mind, is amply proven by his after career. He was being moulded by circumstances even so unpro-

pitious as these, into one who, in due time, should be able to mould circumstances themselves. This frontier life, coarse as it may seem, yet developes the essential stamina of character; it fosters no fastidious refinements, but it produces men capable of material and even of intellectual greatness.

In 1831, Lincoln still changing his home until he should find one thoroughly to suit him, removed to New Salem, in Sagamon county, Illinois; here he remained a year, salesman in a country shop, or store; but trade was not long to engross his energies; the Black Hawk war broke out, and opened a new sphere to him; gave him another opportunity of seeing life in still another phase. The federal government called for volunteers, and he responded. He must have already shown some marks of determination or of character, for he was chosen captain of his company. The settlers of that day were obliged thus to defend their farms and their scanty trade against the attacks of the Indians, not yet permanently repulsed. Illinois, especially, was often beset by the invaders; and the hardy adventurers, mostly like Lincoln from Kentucky and Virginia, were like the New Englanders two centuries earlier, obliged to leave the plow for the rifle, and resist, by turns, the attacks of the Sacs, the Pottawatamies, the Kickapoos, and the Shawnees. So they marched into the wilderness to repel Mucata-Muhicata, the fiercest of the marauders. Generals Gaines and Atkinson led on the settlers, and it was two years before the series of skirmishes had rid the country of its pestilent assailants. Mr. Lincoln thus humorously alluded to this experience many years after in a Congressional speech:

"By the way, Mr. Speaker, did you know I was a

military hero? Yes, sir, in the days of the Black Hawk war I fought, bled, and came away. Speaking of Gen. Cass's career, reminds me of my own. I was not at Sullivan's defeat, but I was about as near it as Cass was to Hull's surrender; and like him I saw the place soon after. It is quite certain that I did not break my sword, for I had none to break; but I bent my musket pretty badly on one occasion. If Cass broke his sword, the idea is, he broke it in desperation. I bent the musket by accident. If Gen. Cass went in advance of me in picking whortleberries, I guess I surpassed him in charges upon the wild onions. If he saw any live fighting Indians, it was more than I did, but I had a good many bloody struggles with the mosquitoes; and although I never fainted from loss of blood, I certainly can say, I was often very hungry."

It is highly probable that in this description, Mr. Lincoln underrated his own services for the sake of ridiculing those of Gen. Cass, who was then running for the Presidency. He, probably, little thought that he himself would one day be in a similar predicament.

In an unsettled region, the arts of war and peace are often confounded, and as republics of ancient and modern times have offered civic honors to their successful generals, it was not surprising that Capt. Lincoln should be nominated for the State Legislature immediately after his return from the Black Hawk war. He was not elected, but the mention of his name in connection with office, at so early an age, only twenty-three, indicates the progress he was making in the estimation and confidence of those by whom he was surrounded. One defeat, however, did not dishearten him; and in 1833 he was elected by the Whig party to the lower House, and served for

five successive sessions. During this legislative career, he first met Stephen A. Douglas, and then began the rivalry which has been at times so fierce, and which has not yet, after a quarter of a century, subsided; but has instead become a matter of national interest. At this time he was a land surveyor, but so poor that in 1837 his instruments were sold under execution. While serving as a member of the State Legislature, and contriving to gain a scanty livelihood by his laborious occupation, Lincoln found time to study the law, and was admitted to the Illinois bar, where he ever since has maintained a position of importance and influence. He distinguished himself by his political affiliations, being early a popular advocate of Whig principles, and especially of the famous protective policy of Henry Clay, which was then one of the matters engrossing public attention and interest. In fact, he was a Whig candidate for Presidential Elector in every quadrennial contest from 1836 to 1852, inclusive, and in 1844 he stumped the state for Clay, making an entire tour of Illinois, and learning to perfection the art of addressing popular assemblages.

Mr. Lincoln's style and manner are peculiarly adapted to produce effects upon what, in this country, are called mass meetings. He is ready, precise, and fluent; witty and humorous by turns; has a good command of forcible and telling, but homely language—all the more telling, because homely; his illustrations are apt, his arguments often cogent, his good-nature and self-possession unflinching. His enunciation is slow and emphatic, and his whole bearing indicates great sincerity and earnestness, which alone are sufficient to awaken the sympathy of his listeners. His features are not handsome, but extremely mobile; his mouth particularly so. He has a faculty of

contorting that feature in a style excessively ludicrous, and which never fails to provoke uproarious merriment. In fact, the good humor that gleams in his eye, and lurks in the corners of his mouth, is perfectly irresistible. His complexion is dark, his eyes small but twinkling, his hair of a mingled grey and brown, his nose long and penetrating; his whole countenance indicates character, and is susceptible of an expression of great impressiveness, all the more remarkable from the contrast with the extremely humorous air it sometimes assumes: the forehead and nostrils, to a physiognomist, afford sure evidence of thought. He is tall and lank in figure; at once elastic and awkward in his ordinary movements, but when infused with that profound earnestness he so often manifests, all his gesticulation is appropriate; his voice then becomes sharp and powerful, his movements lose their angularity, and that magnetic quality seems evolved that is only found in natural orators, but which is more effective in moving or swaying the passions and sometimes the convictions of an audience, than the most elaborate results of the oratory of the schools.

The quality of his speeches will be sufficiently indicated in this volume; they are, however, eminently addressed to the popular mind. Although they often contain arguments and are marked by peculiarities that scholars and rhetoricians will appreciate, their eloquence is natural, their rhetoric unstudied. The language is not elegant, but frequently has ten times more force than the carefully rounded periods which lose their point by being moulded and smoothed so persistently. In fact, all the peculiarities and excellencies of Abraham Lincoln are those of a man whose life has been spent in the West; who has made himself, who is accustomed to dealing with

men of all sorts and conditions, whose talents and energies are undoubted and matured, but not refined or highly cultivated. His personal demeanor is of the same sort. Those who have known him best, describe him as genial, manly, frank, and although his experiences have been of the roughest kind, free from many of the habits common among his associates. He neither drinks, nor chews, nor swears, nor smokes, and even the most inveterate advocate of these practices will acknowledge that such abstinence in one surrounded by his associations, is an indication of more than ordinary firmness and independence of character. The synonym of "Honest Old Abe" betrays the estimation put upon his integrity, and conveys also an intimation of his personal popularity. A writer in the "Evening Post," speaks thus of an interview with the candidate of the Republican party:

"It had been reported by some of Mr. Lincoln's political enemies that he was a man who lived in the 'lowest hoosier style,' and I thought I would see for myself. Accordingly, as soon as the business of the Convention was closed, I took the cars for Springfield. I found Mr. Lincoln living in a handsome, but not pretentious, double two-story frame house, having a wide hall running through the centre, with parlors on both sides, neatly, but not ostentatiously, furnished. It was just such a dwelling as a majority of the well-to-do residents of these fine western towns occupy. Every thing about it had a look of comfort and independence. The library I remarked in passing, particularly, and I was pleased to see long rows of books, which told of the scholarly tastes and culture of the family.

"Lincoln received us with great, and to me, surprising urbanity. I had seen him before in New York, and brought with me an impression of his awkward and ungainly manner; but in his own house, where he

doubtless feels himself freer than in the strange New York circles, he had thrown this off, and appeared easy, if not graceful. He is, as you know, a tall, lank man, with a long neck, and his ordinary movements are unusually angular, even out west. As soon, however, as he gets interested in conversation, his face lights up and his attitudes and gestures assume a certain dignity and impressiveness. His conversation is fluent, agreeable, and polite. You see at once from it that he is a man of decided and original character. His views are all his own; such as he has worked out from a patient and varied scrutiny of life, and not such as he has learned from others. Yet he cannot be called opinionated. He listens to others like one eager to learn, and his replies evince at the same time both modesty and self-reliance. I should say that sound common sense was the principal quality of his mind, although at times a striking phrase or word reveals a peculiar vein of thought. He tells a story well, with a strong idiomatic smack, and seems to relish humor both in himself and others. Our conversation was mainly political, but of a general nature. One thing Mr. Lincoln remarked which I will venture to repeat. He said that in the coming presidential canvass he was wholly uncommitted to any cabals or cliques, and that he meant to keep himself free from them, and from all pledges and promises.

Mr. Lincoln's early political advancement was not rapid, for he espoused the cause which in Illinois was unpopular; when he entered public life the State was decidedly Jacksonian; it even resisted the avalanche of Whig success, which in 1840 overwhelmed the country, and carried Harrison triumphantly to Washington; it was one of the seven States that then cast its electoral vote for Van Buren; it was unfavorable both to Clay and to Taylor, and to this day has never elected a Whig to the United States Senate; but in despite of all these,

that to a man bent merely on personal aggrandizement, would have been effectual reasons for changing his political relations, Lincoln remained firm in the faith he first professed. His Whig comrades appreciated this fidelity. He was only thirty-five when chosen to head the Clay electoral ticket—a position he has since maintained, either in the Whig or Republican party, until the present year, when his name will not probably be included in the list. He has, however, never but once, since 1844, been a candidate for any other office in the gift of the people, although he has repeatedly worked in behalf of his party, stumping the state at every Presidential election with vigor, if not with success.

In 1846 he was elected to Congress from the Central District of Illinois; he was the only Whig in the state delegation of seven, and his majority (1511), was the largest ever given in that District to any candidate opposed to the Democracy; larger even than that received by Gen. Taylor, and twice larger than Henry Clay's; so that his popularity among those with whom he lived may be fairly affirmed. During the first session of the thirtieth Congress (that only in which he served), he made three important speeches, two of them on what are now forgotten issues—the Mexican War, and the Presidential canvass of 1848; in the former, his attack on the President was pungent, and severe, and logical; in the latter, his Western style of oratory was still more fully developed; on each occasion he maintained with vigor and ability the views of the Whig party. He was a warm and personal friend of Henry Clay, and advocated the doctrines advanced by that statesman with all the ardor of which he was capable.

The following resolutions introduced by him on the

Mexican War question, give the gist of the ideas that were more amply set forth in his speech of a few weeks later.

RESOLUTIONS.

MR. LINCOLN moved the following preambles and resolutions, which were read and laid over under the rule :

“Whereas the President of the United States, in his message of May 11, 1846, has declared that “the Mexican Government not only refused to receive him (the envoy of the United States), or listen to his propositions, but after a long-continued series of menaces, have at last invaded our territory and shed the blood of our fellow citizens on our own soil.”

And again in his message of December 8, 1846, that “we had ample cause of war against Mexico long before the breaking out of hostilities, but even then we forbore to take redress into our own hands until Mexico herself became the aggressor, by invading our soil in hostile array, and shedding the blood of our citizens.”

And yet again in the message of December 7, 1847, that “the Mexican Government refused even to hear the terms of adjustment which he (our minister of peace), was authorized to propose, and finally, under wholly unjustifiable pretexts, involved the two countries in war, by invading the territory of the State of Texas, striking the first blow, and shedding the blood of our citizens on our own soil.”

And whereas this House is desirous to obtain a full knowledge of all the facts which go to establish whether

the particular spot on which the blood of our citizens was so shed, was or was not at that time our own soil. Therefore,

Resolved by the House of Representatives, That the President of the United States be respectfully requested to inform this House,

1st. Whether the spot on which the blood of our citizens was shed, as in his messages declared, was or was not within the Territory of Spain, at least after the treaty of 1819, until the Mexican revolution.

2nd. Whether that spot is or is not within the territory which was wrested from Spain by the revolutionary Government of Mexico.

3rd. Whether that spot is or is not within a settlement of people, which settlement has existed ever since long before the Texas revolution, and until its inhabitants fled before the approach of the United States Army.

4th. Whether that settlement is or is not isolated from any and all other settlements by the Gulf and the Rio Grande, on the south and west, and by wide uninhabited regions, on the north and east.

5th. Whether the people of that settlement, or a majority of them, or any of them, have ever submitted themselves to the Government or laws of Texas or of the United States, by consent or by compulsion, either by accepting office, or voting at elections, or paying tax, or serving on juries, or having process served upon them, or in any other way.

6th. Whether the people of that settlement did or did not flee from the approach of the United States army, leaving unprotected their homes and their growing crops, before the blood was shed, as in the message stated; and whether the first blood, so shed, was or was not shed

within the enclosure of one of the people who had thus fled from it.

7th. Whether our citizens, whose blood was shed, as in his messages declared, were or were not at that time, armed officers and soldiers, sent into that settlement by the military order of the President, through the Secretary of War.

8th. Whether the military force of the United States was or was not so sent into that settlement after General Taylor had more than once intimated to the war department that, in his opinion, no such movement was necessary to the defence or protection of Texas."

The speech itself that was made in favor of these resolutions was forcible, both logical and humorous by turns, and a successful initiatory effort in Lincoln's congressional career. It was followed up by one less elaborate, on the Soldiers' Bounty; and on the 4th of May, 1848, some few remarks were made by him in regard to the payment by government for the horses lost in the war by the Texas volunteers. These we append: they indicate Lincoln's desire for fairness in the distribution of governmental favors.

SOLDIERS' BOUNTY.

Mr. Lincoln said: "If there was a general desire on the part of the House to pass the bill now, he should be glad to have it done—concurring, as he did generally, with the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Johnson), that the postponement might jeopard the safety of the proposition. If, however, a reference was to be made, he wished to make a very few remarks in relation to the

several subjects desired by gentlemen to be embraced in amendments to the ninth section of the act of the last session of Congress. The first amendment declared by members of this House, had for its only object to give bounty lands to such persons as had served for a time as privates, but had never been discharged as such, because promoted to office. That subject, and no other, was embraced in this bill. There were some others who desired, while they were legislating on this subject, that they should also give bounty lands to the volunteers of the war of 1812. His friend from Maryland said there were no such men. He (Mr. L.) did not say there were many, but he was very confident there were some. His friend from Kentucky, near him, (Mr. Gaines), told him he himself was one.

“There was still another proposition touching this matter; that was, that persons entitled to bounty land, should, by law, be entitled to locate those lands in parcels, and not be required to locate them in one body, as was provided by the existing law.

“Now he had carefully drawn up a bill embracing these three separate propositions, which he intended to propose as a substitute for all these bills in the House, or in Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, at some suitable time. If there was a disposition on the part of the House to act at once on this separate proposition, he repeated that, with the gentleman from Arkansas, he should prefer it, lest they should lose all. But if there was to be a reference, he desired to introduce his Bill embracing the three propositions, thus enabling the Committee and the House to act at the same time, whether favorably or unfavorably upon all.”

TEXAS VOLUNTEERS.

MAY 4, 1848.

MR. LINCOLN said, "The objection started by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Hall), struck him as being a sound one; and he wished to ascertain if there was any thing further to be learned about this claim, for he desired fully to understand it. He understood that the volunteers who served in Mexico were not by any general law entitled to pay for lost horses, and he understood that if this resolution should pass, the Texas volunteers would be entitled to compensation for lost horses. Thus they would be placed in more favorable circumstances than others."

Mr. Lincoln also said, "The payment for these lost horses came within a class of cases in which he was a good deal like a gentleman near him, who was in favor of paying for everything by way of being sure of paying all those that were right. But if this resolution should be passed, and the general law should fail, then everybody but these Texas volunteers would go without their compensation. He was not willing to do any thing that would produce such a result. He preferred placing the Texas volunteers on a level with all other volunteers, and therefore, he should vote for the reconsideration."

Lincoln's penetration and acumen are apparent in the following terse remarks, which are so lucid and comprehensive that they require no explanation.

VIRGINIA COURTS.

JUNE 28, 1848.

MR. LINCOLN said, "He felt unwilling to be either unjust or ungenerous, and he wanted to understand the real case of this Judicial officer. The gentleman from Virginia had stated that he had to hold eleven courts. Now, everybody knew that it was not the habit of the district Judges of the United States in other states to hold any thing like that number of courts; and he therefore took it for granted that this must happen under a peculiar law, which required that a large number of courts be holden every year; and these laws he further supposed were passed at the request of the people of that Judicial District. It came, then, to this: that the people in the Western District of Virginia had got eleven Courts to be held among them in one year, for their own accommodation; and being thus better accommodated than their neighbors elsewhere, they wanted their Judge to be a little better paid. In Illinois, there had been, until the present season, but one District Court held in the year. There were now to be two. Could it be that the Western District of Virginia furnished more business for a Judge than the whole State of Illinois."

The following views on the price of public lands seem eminently just, and are interesting, as coming from one who may hereafter be very influential in administering laws similar to that which he here discusses.

THE PUBLIC LANDS.

MAY 11, 1848.

MR. LINCOLN moved to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed. He stated to the House that he had made this motion for the purpose of obtaining an opportunity to say a few words in relation to a point raised in the course of the debate on this bill, which he would now proceed to make, if in order. The point in the case to which he referred, arose on the amendment that was submitted by the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Collamer), in Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, and which was afterwards renewed in the House, in relation to the question whether the reserved sections, which, by some bills heretofore passed, by which an appropriation of land had been made to Wisconsin, had been enhanced in value, should be reduced to the minimum price of the public lands. The question of the reduction in value of those sections was, to him, at this time, a matter very nearly of indifference. He was inclined to desire that Wisconsin should be obliged by having it reduced. But the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. C. B. Smith), the Chairman of the Committee on the Territories, yesterday associated that question with the general question, which is now, to some extent, agitated in Congress, of making appropriations of alternate sections of land to aid the States in making internal improvements, and enhancing the prices of the section reserved, and the gentleman from Indiana took ground against that policy. He did not make any special argument in favor of Wisconsin; but he took ground generally against the policy of giving

alternate sections of land, and enhancing the price of the reserved sections. Now, he (Mr. L.) did not at this time, take the floor for the purpose of attempting to make an argument on the general subject. He rose simply to protest against the doctrine which the gentleman from Indiana had avowed in the course of what he (Mr. L.) could not but consider an unsound argument.

It might however be true, for anything he knew, that the gentleman from Indiana might convince him that his argument was sound; but he (Mr. L.) feared that gentleman would not be able to convince a majority in Congress that it was sound. It was true, the question appeared in a different aspect to persons in consequence of a difference in the point from which they looked at it. It did not look to persons residing east of the mountains as it did to those who lived among the public lands. But, for his part, he would state that if Congress would make a donation of alternate sections of public lands for the purpose of internal improvement in his state, and forbid the reserved sections being sold at \$1.25, he should be glad to see the appropriation made, though he should prefer it if the reserved sections were not enhanced in price. He repeated, he should be glad to have such appropriations made, even though the reserved sections should be enhanced in price. He did not wish to be understood as concurring in any intimation that they would refuse to receive such an appropriation of alternate sections of land because a condition enhancing the price of the reserved sections should be attached thereto. He believed his position would now be understood, if not, he feared he should not be able to make himself understood.

But before he took his seat he would remark that the

Senate, during the present session, had passed a bill making appropriations of land on that principle for the benefit of the State in which he resided—the State of Illinois. The alternate sections were to be given for the purpose of constructing roads, and the reserved sections were to be enhanced in value in consequence. When the bill came here for the action of this House, it had been received, and was now before the Committee on Public Lands—he desired much to see it passed as it was, if it could be put in a more favorable form for the State of Illinois. When it should be before this House, if any member from a section of the Union in which these lands did not lie, whose interest might be less than that which he felt, should propose a reduction of the price of the reserved sections to \$1.25, he should be much obliged; but he did not think it would be well for those who came from the section of the Union in which the lands lay, to do so. He wished it, then, to be understood, that he did not join in the warfare against the principle which had engaged the minds of some members of Congress who were favorable to improvements in the western country.

There was a good deal of force, he admitted, in what fell from the Chairman of the Committee on Territories. It might be that there was no precise justice in raising the price of the reserved sections to \$2.50 per acre. It might be proper that the price should be enhanced to some extent, though not to double the usual price; but he should be glad to have such an appropriation with the reserved sections at \$2.50; he should be better pleased to have the price of those sections at something less; and he should be still better pleased to have them without any enhancement at all.

There was one portion of the argument of the gentle-

man from Indiana, the Chairman of the Committee on Territories (Mr. Smith), which he wished to take occasion to say that he did not view as unsound. He alluded to the statement that the General Government was interested in these internal improvements being made, inasmuch as they increased the value of the lands that were unsold, and they enabled the Government to sell lands which could not be sold without them. Thus, then, the Government gained by internal improvements, as well as by the general good which the people derived from them, and it might be, therefore, that the lands should not be sold for more than \$1.50, instead of the price being doubled. He, however, merely mentioned this in passing, for he only rose to state, as the principle of giving these lands for the purposes which he had mentioned had been laid hold of and considered favorably, and as there were some gentlemen who had constitutional scruples about giving money for these purposes, who would not hesitate to give land, that he was not willing to have it understood that he was one of those who made war against that principle. This was all he desired to say, and having accomplished the object with which he rose, he withdrew his motion to reconsider."

The other speeches made at this session were a strong one in favor of internal improvements, and a witty party speech to which we have already alluded.

At this time the two houses of Congress were crowded with men of ability: Hamlin, who is now running with Lincoln on the same ticket; Houston, who at one time seemed likely to be his opponent in the present Presidential canvass; Hunter, of Virginia; Reverdy Johnson, Calhoun, Dickinson, Bell, the nominee of the Third party, Douglas, Webster, Seward, Cass, Shields, Benton,

Clayton, Corwin, Cameron, were in the Senate; and in the House, Jefferson Davis, John Quincy Adams, Wilmot, Toombs, Giddings, Greeley, Washington Hunt, and others who have since attained distinction, were his compeers. This was the session when the famous Wilmot proviso was introduced, and Lincoln voted forty-two times in its favor. He was, as we have said, the only Whig in the delegation from Illinois, and upheld the cause of his party manfully; the various questions of the Mexican War, the Texas Boundary, the Oregon Bill, and the Harbor Improvements, as they by turns engaged the attention of the Congress, afforded him ample opportunities for studying public affairs; and it is probable that their discussion, and the contact with so many minds of first rate calibre, had an influence on his own intellect, developing and maturing its powers. He thus early in his career took the stand which he has ever since maintained with the opponents of slavery: his opposition to the Mexican war, his voting for the Wilmot proviso, his speeches and votes, all were precursors of the bill he brought in, during the second session of the thirtieth Congress, providing for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, under certain restrictions, the abolition to be consummated only when the inhabitants of the District should vote in its favor. The resolutions, and a few remarks made by him in presenting them, we here append:

Jan. 10, 1849.—In the debate on the slave trade in the District of Columbia, Mr. Lincoln introduced an amendment to a bill before the House.

Mr. L. read as follows:

Strike out all after the word “resolved,” and insert the following—

“That the Committee on the District of Columbia be instructed to report a bill in substance, as follows:

Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, That no person not now within the District of Columbia, nor now owned by any person or persons now resident within it, nor hereafter born within it, shall ever be held in slavery within said District.

Sec. 2. That no person now within said District, or now owned by any person or persons now resident within the same, or hereafter born within it, shall ever be held in slavery without the limits of said District: Provided, That officers of the Government of the United States, being citizens of the slaveholding States, coming into said District on public business, and remaining only so long as may be reasonably necessary for that object, may be attended into and out of said District, and while there, by the necessary servants of themselves and their families, without their right to hold such servants in service being impaired.

Sec. 3. That all children born of slave mothers within said District, on or after the 1st day of January, in the year of our Lord 1850, shall be free; but shall be reasonably supported and educated by the respective owners of their mothers, or by their heirs or representatives, and shall serve reasonable service as apprentices to such owners, heirs, or representatives, until they respectively arrive at the age of — years, when they shall be entirely free: And the municipal authorities of Washington and Georgetown, within their respective jurisdictional limits, are hereby empowered and required to make all suitable and necessary provision for enforce-

ing obedience to this section, on the part of both masters and apprentices.

Sec. 4. That all persons now within this District, lawfully held as slaves, or now owned by any person or persons now resident within said District, shall remain such at the will of their respective owners, their heirs or legal representatives: Provided that such owner, or his legal representatives, may at any time receive from the Treasury of the United States the full value of his or her slave, of the class in this section mentioned, upon which such slave shall be forthwith and for ever free: And provided further, That the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall be a board for determining the value of such slaves as their owners desire to emancipate under this section, and whose duty it shall be to hold a session for the purpose on the first Monday of each calendar month, to receive all applications, and, on satisfactory evidence in each case that the person presented for valuation is a slave, and of the class in the section mentioned, and is owned by the applicant, shall value such slave at his or her full cash value, and give to the applicant an order on the Treasury for the amount, and also to such slave a certificate of freedom.

Sec. 5. That the municipal authorities of Washington and Georgetown, within their respective jurisdictional limits, are hereby empowered and required to provide active and efficient means to arrest and deliver up to their owners all fugitive slaves escaping into said District.

Sec. 6. That the elective officers within said District of Columbia are hereby empowered and required to open polls at all the usual places of holding elections, on the first Monday of April next, and receive the vote of

every free white male citizen above the age of twenty-one years, having resided within said District for the period of one year or more next preceding the time of such voting for or against this act, to proceed in taking said votes in all respects not herein specified, as at elections under the municipal laws, and with as little delay as possible to transmit correct statements of the votes so cast to the President of the United States; and it shall be the duty of the President to count such votes immediately, and if a majority of them be found to be for this act, to forthwith issue his proclamation giving notice of the fact; and this act shall only be in full force and effect on and after the day of such proclamation.

Sec. 7. That involuntary servitude for the punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall in nowise be prohibited by this act.

Sec. 8. That for all purposes of this act, the jurisdictional limits of Washington are extended to all parts of the District of Columbia not included within the present limits of Georgetown."

Mr. Lincoln then said, "that he was authorized to say that of about fifteen of the leading citizens of the District of Columbia to whom this proposition had been submitted, there was not one but who approved of such a proposition. He did not wish to be misunderstood. He did not know whether or not they would vote for his bill on the first Monday of April; but he repeated that out of fifteen persons to whom it had been submitted, he had authority to say that every one of them desired that some such proposition as this should pass."

While a member of Congress, Mr. Lincoln was elected

to the Whig Nominating Convention of 1848; before which he advocated the claims of Gen. Taylor to the presidency, and after the nomination he was persistent in his efforts to accomplish the election of his favorite candidate. And, without much conceit, a resemblance may in many things be traced between the characters, if not the careers, of Rough and Ready and Honest old Abe; they might exchange epithets appropriately. Mr. Lincoln's district gave Taylor a heavier majority than any other Whig but Lincoln himself was ever honored by, in that quarter of the country; the result doubtless in some measure of his persevering ardor and energy.

In 1849 he was a candidate before the Illinois legislature for United States Senator, but the Democrats were in the majority and Gen. Shields was elected over Lincoln; in 1852 he was a warm supporter of Gen. Scott, and looked upon by the Whigs of Illinois as one of their most efficient leaders.

After his retirement from Congress, Mr. Lincoln took no prominent part in politics for a number of years. His private affairs claimed his attention; he had married, his family was increasing, but he was not rich, and is not so to-day; he therefore devoted himself very assiduously to the pursuit of his profession until 1854, when the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and the consequent wide-spread agitation throughout the country, drew him again into the arena of politics. As might have been predicted by any one familiar with his previous sentiments and course, he vigorously opposed the Nebraska bill; he took the stump against its author, Mr. Douglas, and battled it with immense energy. The efforts of its opponents were in some measure successful in Illinois, and for the first time a majority of the legislature about to elect a United States

Senator was unfavorable to the democratic party. Nine-tenths of this majority were Whigs, and desired Mr. Lincoln's elevation to the vacant seat in the upper House of Congress, but the other tenth had been Democrats and were unwilling to cast their votes for a Whig. The republican party was then only in its conception; the various elements of an opposition were chaotic, and it was necessary to manage skilfully in order to accomplish their coalescence. Mr. Lincoln himself earnestly entreated his political friends to give up their preference for him. He succeeded in inducing them to vote for Judge Trumbull, an anti-Nebraska Democrat, who was thus elected to the United States Senate. This was in 1855, and indicates both the pre-eminence Mr. Lincoln had won among those who had been his allies for so long, and the amount of his influence with them; first in that they should have selected him for so high a position over such men as Yates, Logan, Grimshaw, and Browning; and next that he should have been able to persuade them to waive that preference and cast their votes as he desired. It also pointed to the importance he was likely to attain in the counsels of the new party, though the absolute leadership of that party doubtless then seemed entirely beyond his ambition. However, at the first Republican National Convention, at Cincinnati, in the following year, the delegates from Illinois presented his name for the Vice-Presidency, thus signifying the hold he had upon their respect and regard. He also headed the Fremont electoral ticket in that State, at the ensuing election, and worked earnestly and persistently in support of the ticket during the canvass.

His name, however popular in Illinois, and well-known throughout the entire North-West, did not

become national until the furious contest between himself and Douglas in 1858, whose fame has already spread throughout the country, but is now destined to become still more familiar to all, of every phase of politics, who take an interest in public affairs. The course of Stephen A. Douglas in Congress had provoked everywhere the most remarkable difference of opinion, and excited in every quarter of the land the most intense political strife; but no where was the agitation and excitement more intense than in his own state of Illinois. The two old parties were both disrupted; the Whigs and a portion of the Democrats concurred in a reprehension of Mr. Douglas's conduct; the Administration was, for its own reasons, bitterly opposed to him: while, on the other hand, his personal influence and popularity, which had always been enormous, the fact that he was regarded by many as the destined victim of governmental spite and the representative of sturdy political independence, together with the immense strength of party affiliations and associations, conspired to give him hosts of followers. His term of office in the Senate had expired, and the legislature was to be elected which should appoint his successor. A re-appointment would be to him an endorsement by his own State, and a presentation to the Democratic party of his claims for the Presidency. This fact was thoroughly understood by himself, by the politicians of all sorts and grades, and by the country. The Republicans, therefore, determined to make a great struggle, and, if possible, defeat him on his own ground. At their nominating convention at Springfield, Mr. Lincoln was unanimously designated the Republican candidate for Senator; he was

also desired to stump the State as the representative man of the Republican doctrine.

The contest which ensued was one of the most hardly fought that has ever occurred in our political history. The State was stumped with extraordinary thoroughness, both candidates taking the field, arguing the whole matter with all the powers of logic, and wit, and eloquence at their command, while the country looked on eagerly for the result, and the population of the state attended to hear the arguments of the two rivals, and determine for themselves how they should act. Each had warm friends; each was emphatically the representative of a great party and of a great principle; personal feelings were concerned, and a great public question of the very highest consequence was at issue. What gave the strife a very peculiar aspect, imparting additional intensity and interest, was the fact that the two candidates repeatedly discussed the mooted questions in each other's presence. The ability manifested by each on these occasions was marked, and is acknowledged by his opponent. It is, in fact, impossible to imagine any stronger illustration of Democratic institutions, any more remarkable feature of American life and character, than this appeal to the people by the champions of two great opposing parties. Instead of wheedling at courts, or intriguing in cabinets, or writing diplomatic notes, or bargaining for office and emoluments, or even arguing in senates, and convincing educated and talented assemblies; here were two men, both sprung from the people, both possessed of remarkable energy of character, both elevated to the leadership of their respective parties; one had long been prominent in the councils of the nation, had been often

an aspirant for the highest position in the country ; he had initiated a measure which provoked the wildest and profoundest opposition of any political act in this century ; he had, nevertheless, succeeded in carrying that measure, and now he came to the people, the rough, common people of Western Illinois, the farmers and backwoodsmen, to support him, to endorse him, to maintain him. By their verdict he must stand or fall ; to them he argued his case ; before them personally he pleaded his cause. His antagonist also was present, and accused him to his face of political crimes ; and day after day, and night after night, in town after town, the competitors strove before the mighty jury of the people for the mastery. No struggle in the Olympic games, no contest in senate chambers of ancient Rome, or in parliament of modern Britain, was ever more remarkable, or listened to or looked upon by more attentive crowds. From June to November the canvass continued ; at seven different places the debate was held between the champions.

At Springfield, after his nomination, which was singular, because senators, not being elected by the people, are not usually nominated by conventions,—at Springfield, Mr. Lincoln read a speech, which had been carefully prepared, and which was accepted throughout the country, by his party, as an exposition of the views and aims of Republicanism. It follows here, and those who wish to be thoroughly informed of the peculiarities of the party of which Abram Lincoln is now standard-bearer and chief, will do well to study its pages. This speech is also remarkable as containing the famous declaration which preceded even that made by Senator Seward, at Rochester, that “ a house divided

against itself cannot stand." What Lincoln really said, and what he meant can now be directly ascertained.

SPEECH OF HON. ABRAM LINCOLN.

SPRINGFIELD, *June 17, 1858.*

MR. PRESIDENT, AND GENTLEMEN OF THE CONVENTION : If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do, and how to do it. We are now far into the fifth year, since a policy was initiated with the avowed object, and confident promise, of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion, it will not cease, until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. "A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction ; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new—North as well as South.

Have we no tendency to the latter condition ?

Let any one who doubts, carefully contemplate that now almost complete legal combination—piece of machinery, so to speak—compounded of the Nebraska doctrine, and the Dred Scott decision. Let him consider not only what work the machinery is adapted to do, and how well adapted ; but also, let him study the history of its construction, and trace, if he can, or rather fail, if he can, to trace the evidences of design, and con-

cert of action, among its chief architects, from the beginning.

The new year of 1854 found slavery excluded from more than half the States by State Constitutions, and from most of the national territory by Congressional prohibition. Four days later, commenced the struggle which ended in repealing that Congressional prohibition. This opened all the national territory to slavery, and was the first point gained.

But, so far, Congress only had acted ; and an indorsement by the people, real or apparent, was indispensable, to save the point already gained, and give chance for more.

This necessity had not been overlooked ; but had been provided for, as well as might be, in the notable argument of "squatter sovereignty," otherwise called "sacred right of self-government," which latter phrase, though expressive of the only rightful basis of any government, was so perverted in this attempted use of it as to amount to just this : That if any *one* man choose to enslave *another*, no *third* man shall be allowed to object. That argument was incorporated into the Nebraska bill itself, in the language which follows : "It being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom ; but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." Then opened the roar of loose declamation in favor of "Squatter Sovereignty," and "sacred right of self-government." "But," said opposition members, "let us amend the bill so as to expressly declare that the people of the Territory may exclude slavery." "Not we," said the friends of the measure ; and down they voted the amendment.

While the Nebraska bill was passing through Congress, a law case involving the question of a negro's freedom, by reason of his owner having voluntarily taken him first into a free State and then into a Territory covered by the Congressional prohibition, and

held him as a slave for a long time in each, was passing through the U. S. Circuit Court for the District of Missouri; and both Nebraska bill and law suit were brought to a decision in the same month of May, 1854. The negro's name was "Dred Scott," which name now designates the decision finally made in the case. Before the then next Presidential election, the law case came to, and was argued in the Supreme Court of the United States; but the decision of it was deferred until after the election. Still, before the election, Senator Trumbull, on the floor of the Senate, requested the leading advocate of the Nebraska bill to state his opinion whether the people of a Territory can constitutionally exclude slavery from their limits; and the latter answers: "That is a question for the Supreme Court."

The election came. Mr. Buchanan was elected, and the endorsement, such as it was, secured. That was the second point gained. The endorsement, however, fell short of a clear popular majority by nearly four hundred thousand votes, and so, perhaps, was not overwhelmingly reliable and satisfactory. The outgoing President, in his last annual message, as impressively as possible echoed back upon the people the weight and authority of the endorsement. The Supreme Court met again; did not announce their decision, but ordered a re-argument. The Presidential inauguration came, and still no decision of the court; but the incoming President in his inaugural address, fervently exhorted the people to abide by the forthcoming decision, whatever it might be. Then, in a few days, came the decision.

The reputed author of the Nebraska bill finds an early occasion to make a speech at this capital endorsing the Dred Scott decision, and vehemently denouncing all opposition to it. The new President, too, seizes the early occasion of the Silliman letter to endorse and strongly construe that decision, and to express his astonishment that any different view had ever been entertained!

At length a squabble springs up between the President and the author of the Nebraska bill, on the mere

question of fact, whether the Lecompton Constitution was or was not, in any just sense, made by the people of Kansas ; and in that quarrel the latter declares that all he wants is a fair vote for the people, and that he cares not whether slavery be voted *down* or voted *up*. I do not understand his declaration that he cares not whether slavery be voted down or voted up, to be intended by him other than as an apt definition of the policy he would impress upon the public mind—the principle for which he declares he has suffered so much, and is ready to suffer to the end. And well may he cling to that principle. If he has any parental feeling, well may he cling to it. That principle is the only shred left of his original Nebraska doctrine. Under the Dred Scott decision, “squatter sovereignty” squatted out of existence, tumbled down like temporary scaffolding—like the mould at the foundry, served through one blast and fell back into loose sand—helped to carry an election, and then was kicked to the winds. His late joint struggle with the Republicans, against the Lecompton Constitution, involves nothing of the original Nebraska doctrine. That struggle was made on a point—the right of a people to make their own constitution—upon which he and the Republicans have never differed.

The several points of the Dred Scott decision, in connection with Senator Douglas’s “care not” policy, constitute the piece of machinery, in its present state of advancement. This was the third point gained. The working points of that machinery are :

First, That no negro slave, imported as such from Africa, and no descendant of such slave, can ever be a citizen of any State, in the sense of that term as used in the Constitution of the United States. This point is made in order to deprive the negro, in every possible event, of the benefit of that provision of the United States Constitution, which declares that “The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.”

Secondly, That “subject to the Constitution of the United States,” neither Congress nor a Territorial Legis-

lature can exclude Slavery from any United States territory. This point is made in order that individual men may fill up the Territories with slaves, without danger of losing them as property, and thus to enhance the chances of permanency to the institution through all the future.

Thirdly, That whether the holding a negro in actual slavery in a free State, makes him free, as against the holder, the United States courts will not decide, but will leave to be decided by the courts of any slave State the negro may be forced into by the master. This point is made, not to be pressed immediately; but if acquiesced in for awhile, and apparently endorsed by the people at an election, then to sustain the logical conclusion that what Dred Scott's master might lawfully do with Dred Scott, in the free state of Illinois, every other master may lawfully do with any other one, or one thousand slaves, in Illinois, or in any other free state.

Auxiliary to all this, and working hand in hand with it, the Nebraska doctrine, or what is left of it, is to educate and mould public opinion, at least Northern public opinion, not to care whether slavery is voted down or voted up. This shows exactly where we now are; and partially, also, whither we are tending.

It will throw additional light on the latter, to go back, and run the mind over the string of historical facts already stated. Several things will now appear less dark and mysterious than they did when they were transpiring. The people were to be left "perfectly free," "subject only to the constitution." What the constitution had to do with it, outsiders could not then see. Plainly enough now, it was an exactly fitted niche, for the Dred Scott decision to afterward come in, and declare the perfect freedom of the people to be just no freedom at all. Why was the amendment, expressly declaring the right of the people, voted down? Plainly enough now: the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the Dred Scott decision. Why was the court decision held up? Why even a senator's individual opinion withheld, till after the Presidential election?

Plainly enough now : the speaking out then would have damaged the perfectly free argument upon which the election was to be carried. Why the outgoing President's felicitation on the endorsement? Why the delay of a re-argument? Why the incoming President's advance exhortation in favor of the decision? These things look like the cautious patting and petting of a spirited horse preparatory to mounting him, when it is dreaded that he may give the rider a fall. And why the hasty after-endorsement of the decision by the President and others?

We cannot absolutely know that all these exact adaptations are the result of preconcert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have been gotten out at different times and places and by different workmen—Stephen, Franklin, Roger and James, for instance—and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortices exactly fitting, and all the lengths and proportions of the different pieces exactly adapted to their respective places, and not a piece too many or too few—not omitting even scaffolding—or, if a single piece be lacking, we see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared yet to bring such piece in—in such a case, we find it impossible not to believe that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood one another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common plan or draft drawn up before the first blow was struck.

It should not be overlooked that, by the Nebraska bill, the people of a *State* as well as Territory, were to be left "perfectly free," "subject only to the Constitution." Why mention a State? They were legislating for Territories, and not for or about States. Certainly the people of a State are and ought to be subject to the Constitution of the United States; but why is mention of this lugged into this merely Territorial law? Why are the people of a Territory and the people of a State therein lumped together, and their relation to the Constitution therein treated as being precisely the same?

While the opinion of the court, by Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, and the separate opinions of all the concurring Judges, expressly declare that the Constitution of the United States neither permits Congress nor a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery from any United States Territory, they all omit to declare whether or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the people of a State, to exclude it. *Possibly*, this is a mere omission; but who can be quite sure, if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a declaration of unlimited power in the people of a State to exclude slavery from their limits, just as Chase and Mace sought to get such declaration, in behalf of the people of a Territory, into the Nebraska bill;—I ask, who can be quite sure that it would not have been voted down in the one case as it had been in the other? The nearest approach to the point of declaring the power of a State over slavery, is made by Judge Nelson. He approaches it more than once, using the precise idea, and almost the language, too, of the Nebraska act. On one occasion, his exact language is, “except in cases where the power is restrained by the Constitution of the United States, the law of the State is supreme over the subject of slavery within its jurisdiction.” In what cases the power of the States is so restrained by the United States Constitution, is left an open question, precisely as the same question, as to the restraint on the power of the Territories, was left open in the Nebraska act. Put this and that together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit a *State* to exclude slavery from its limits. And this may specially be expected if the doctrine of “care not whether slavery be voted down or voted up,” shall gain upon the public mind sufficiently to give promise that such a decision can be maintained when made.

Such a decision is all that slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in all the States. Welcome, or unwelcome, such decision is probably coming, and will soon be upon

us, unless the power of the present political dynasty shall be met and overthrown. We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free, and we shall awake to the reality instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave State. To meet and overthrow the power of that dynasty, is the work now before all those who would prevent that consummation. That is what we have to do. How can we best do it?

There are those who denounce us openly to their own friends, and yet whisper us softly, that Senator Douglas is the aptest instrument there is with which to affect that object. They wish us to *infer* all, from the fact that he now has a little quarrel with the present head of the dynasty; and that he has regularly voted with us on a single point, upon which he and we have never differed. They remind us that he is a great man, and that the largest of us are very small ones. Let this be granted. But "a living dog is better than a dead lion." Judge Douglas, if not a dead lion, for this work, is at least a caged and toothless one. How can he oppose the advances of slavery? He don't care anything about it. His avowed mission is impressing the "public heart" to *care nothing about it*. A leading Douglas democratic newspaper thinks Douglas's superior talent will be needed to resist the revival of the African slave trade. Does Douglas believe an effort to revive that trade is approaching? He has not said so. Does he really think so? But if it is, how can he resist it? For years he has labored to prove it a sacred right of white men to take negro slaves into the new Territories. Can he possibly show that it is a less sacred right to buy them where they can be bought cheapest? And unquestionably they can be bought cheaper in Africa than in Virginia. He has done all in his power to reduce the whole question of slavery to one of a mere right of property; and as such, how can he oppose the foreign slave trade—how can he refuse that trade in that "property" shall be "perfectly free"—unless he does it as a protection to the home production? And as the home

producers will probably not ask the protection, he will be wholly without a ground of opposition.

SPEECH OF HON. ABRAM LINCOLN.

Delivered in Springfield, Saturday, 'July 17, 1858.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: Another election, which is deemed an important one, is approaching, and, as I suppose, the Republican party will, without much difficulty, elect their State ticket. But in regard to the Legislature, we, the Republicans, labor under some disadvantages. In the first place, we have a Legislature to elect upon an apportionment of the representation made several years ago, when the proportion of the population was far greater in the South (as compared with the North) than it now is; and inasmuch as our opponents hold almost entire sway in the South, and we a correspondingly large majority in the North, the fact that we are now to be represented as we were years ago, when the population was different, is, to us, a very great disadvantage. We had in the year 1855, according to law, a census or enumeration of the inhabitants, taken for the purpose of a new apportionment of representation. We know what a fair apportionment of representation upon that census would give us. We know that it could not, if fairly made, fail to give the Republican party from six to ten more members of the Legislature than they can probably get as the law now stands. It so happened at the last session of the Legislature, that our opponents, holding the control of both branches of the Legislature, steadily refused to give us such an apportionment as we were rightly entitled to have upon the census already taken. The Legislature steadily refused to give us such an apportionment as we were rightfully entitled to have upon the census taken of the population of the State. The Legislature would pass no bill upon that subject, except

such as was at least as unfair to us as the old one, and in which, in some instances, two men in the Democratic regions were allowed to go as far toward sending a member to the Legislature as three were in the Republican regions. Comparison was made at the time as to representative and senatorial districts, which completely demonstrated that such was the fact. Such a bill was passed and tendered to the Republican Governor for his signature; but principally for the reasons I have stated, he withheld his approval, and the bill fell without becoming a law.

Another disadvantage under which we labor is, that there are one or two Democratic Senators who will be members of the next Legislature, and will vote for the election of Senator, who are holding over in districts in which we could, on all reasonable calculation, elect men of our own, if we only had the chance of an election. When we consider that there are but twenty-five Senators in the Senate, taking two from the side where they rightfully belong and adding them to the other, is to us a disadvantage not to be lightly regarded. Still, so it is; we have this to contend with. Perhaps there is no ground of complaint on our part. In attending to the many things involved in the last general election for President, Governor, Auditor, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Members of Congress, of the Legislature, County Officers, and so on, we allowed these things to happen by want of sufficient attention, and we have no cause to complain of our adversaries, so far as this matter is concerned. But we have some cause to complain of the refusal to give us a fair apportionment.

There is still another disadvantage under which we labor, and to which I will ask your attention. It arises out of the relative positions of the two persons who stand before the State as candidates for the Senate. Senator Douglas is of world-wide renown. All the anxious politicians of his party, or who have been of his party for years past, have been looking upon him as certainly, at no distant day, to be the President of the United States. They have seen in his round, jolly, fruitful face,

post-offices, land-offices, marshalships and cabinet appointments, chargeships and foreign missions, bursting and sprouting out in wonderful exuberance, ready to be laid hold of by their greedy hands. And as they have been gazing upon this attractive picture so long, they cannot, in the little distraction that has taken place in the party, bring themselves to give up the charming hope; but with greedier anxiety they rush about him, sustain him, and give him marches, triumphal entries, and receptions beyond what even in the days of his highest prosperity they could have brought about in his favor. On the contrary, nobody has ever expected me to be President. In my poor, lean, lank face, nobody has ever seen that any cabbages were sprouting out. These are disadvantages all, taken together, that the Republicans labor under. We have to fight this battle upon principle, and upon principle alone. I am, in a certain sense, made the standard-bearer in behalf of the Republicans. I was made so merely because there had to be some one so placed—I being in nowise preferable to any other one of the twenty-five—perhaps a hundred we have in the Republican ranks. Then I say I wish it to be distinctly understood and borne in mind, that we have to fight this battle without many—perhaps without any—of the external aids which are brought to bear against us. So I hope those with whom I am surrounded have principle enough to nerve themselves for the task and leave nothing undone, that can be fairly done, to bring about the right result.

After Senator Douglas left Washington, as his movements were made known by the public prints, he tarried a considerable time in the city of New York; and it was heralded that, like another Napoleon, he was lying by and framing the plan of his campaign. It was telegraphed to Washington City, and published in the *Union*, that he was framing his plan for the purpose of going to Illinois to pounce upon and annihilate the treasonable and disunion speech which Lincoln had made here on the 16th of June. Now, I do suppose that the Judge really spent some time in New York maturing the plan of the

campaign, as his friends heralded for him. I have been able, by noting his movements since his arrival in Illinois, to discover evidences confirmatory of that allegation. I think I have been able to see what are the material points of that plan. I will, for a little while, ask your attention to some of them. What I shall point out, though not showing the whole plan, are, nevertheless, the main points, as I suppose.

They are not very numerous. The first is Popular Sovereignty. The second and third are attacks upon my speech made on the 16th of June. Out of these three points—drawing within the range of popular sovereignty the question of the Lecompton Constitution—he makes his principal assault. Upon these his successive speeches are substantially one and the same. On this matter of popular sovereignty I wish to be a little careful. Auxiliary to these main points, to be sure, are their thunderings of cannon, their marching and music, their fizzle-gigs and fire-works; but I will not waste time with them. They are but the little trappings of the campaign.

Coming to the substance—the first point—“popular sovereignty.” It is to be labelled upon the cars in which he travels; put upon the hacks he rides in; to be flaunted upon the arches he passes under, and the banners which wave over him. It is to be dished up in as many varieties as a French cook can produce soups from potatoes. Now, as this is so great a staple of the plan of the campaign, it is worth while to examine it carefully; and if we examine only a very little, and do not allow ourselves to be misled, we shall be able to see that the whole thing is the most arrant Quixotism that was ever enacted before a community. What is the matter of popular sovereignty? The first thing, in order to understand it, is to get a good definition of what it is, and after that to see how it is applied.

I suppose almost every one knows that, in this controversy, whatever has been said has had reference to the question of negro slavery. We have not been in a controversy about the right of the people to govern themselves in the *ordinary* matters of domestic concern in the

States and Territories. Mr. Buchanan, in one of his late messages (I think when he sent up the Lecompton Constitution), urged that the main point to which the public attention had been directed, was not in regard to the great variety of small domestic matters, but was directed to the question of negro slavery; and he asserts, that if the people had had a fair chance to vote on that question, there was no reasonable ground of objection in regard to minor questions. Now, while I think that the people had *not* had given, or offered them, a fair chance upon that slavery question; still, if there had been a fair submission to a vote upon that main question, the President's proposition would have been true to the uttermost. Hence, when hereafter I speak of popular sovereignty, I wish to be understood as applying what I say to the question of slavery only, not to other minor domestic matters of a Territory or a State.

Does Judge Douglas, when he says that several of the past years of his life have been devoted to the question of "popular sovereignty," and that all the remainder of his life shall be devoted to it, does he mean to say that he has been devoting his life to securing to the people of the Territories the right to exclude slavery from the Territories? If he means so to say, he means to deceive; because he and every one knows that the decision of the Supreme Court, which he approves and makes especial ground of attack upon me for disapproving, forbids the people of a Territory to exclude slavery. This covers the whole ground, from the settlement of a Territory till it reaches the degree of maturity entitling it to form a State Constitution. So far as all that ground is concerned, the Judge is not sustaining popular sovereignty, but absolutely opposing it. He sustains the decision which declares that the popular will of the Territories has no constitutional power to exclude slavery during their territorial existence. This being so, the period of time from the first settlement of a Territory till it reaches the point of forming a State Constitution, is not the thing that the Judge has fought for or is fighting for, but on the contrary, he has fought for, and is fighting for, the

thing that annihilates and crushes out that same popular sovereignty.

Well, so much being disposed of, what is left? Why, he is contending for the right of the people, when they come to make a State Constitution, to make it for themselves, and precisely as best suits themselves. I say again, that is Quixotic. I defy contradiction when I declare that the Judge can find no one to oppose him on that proposition. I repeat, there is nobody opposing that proposition on *principle*. Let me not be misunderstood. I know that, with reference to the Lecompton Constitution, I may be misunderstood; but when you understand me correctly, my proposition will be true and accurate. Nobody is opposing, or has opposed, the right of the people, when they form a Constitution, to form it for themselves. Mr. Buchanan and his friends have not done it; they, too, as well as the Republicans and the Anti-Lecompton Democrats, have not done it; but, on the contrary, they together have insisted on the right of the people to form a Constitution for themselves. The difference between the Buchanan men on the one hand, and the Douglas men and the Republicans on the other, has not been on a question of principle, but on a question of *fact*.

The dispute was upon the question of fact, whether the Lecompton Constitution had been fairly formed by the people or not. Mr. Buchanan and his friends have not contended for the contrary principle any more than the Douglas men or the Republicans. They have insisted that whatever of small irregularities existed in getting up the Lecompton Constitution, were such as happen in the settlement of all new Territories. The question was, was it a fair emanation of the people? It was a question of fact and not of principle. As to the principle, all were agreed. Judge Douglas voted with the Republicans upon that matter of fact.

He and they, by their voices and votes, denied that it was a fair emanation of the people. The Administration affirmed that it was. With respect to the evidence bearing upon that question of fact, I readily

agree that Judge Douglas and the Republicans had the right on their side, and that the Administration was wrong. But I state again that, as a matter of principle, there is no dispute upon the right of a people in a Territory, merging into a State to form a Constitution for themselves without outside interference from any quarter. This being so, what is Judge Douglas going to spend his life for? Is he going to spend his life in maintaining a principle that nobody on earth opposes? Does he expect to stand up in majestic dignity, and go through his *apotheosis* and become a god, in the maintaining of a principle which neither man nor mouse in all God's creation is opposing? Now something in regard to the Lecompton Constitution more specially; for I pass from this other question of popular sovereignty as the most arrant humbug that has ever been attempted on an intelligent community.

As to the Lecompton Constitution, I have already said that on the question of fact as to whether it was a fair emanation of the people or not, Judge Douglas with the Republicans and some Americans had greatly the argument against the Administration; and while I repeat this, I wish to know what there is in the opposition of Judge Douglas to the Lecompton Constitution that entitles him to be considered the only opponent to it—as being *par excellence* the very quintessence of that opposition. I agree to the rightfulness of his opposition. He in the Senate and his class of men there formed the number *three* and no more. In the House of Representatives his class of men—the Anti-Lecompton Democrats—formed a number of about twenty. It took one hundred and twenty to defeat the measure, against one hundred and twelve. Of the votes of that one hundred and twenty, Judge Douglas's friends furnished twenty, to add to which there were six Americans and ninety-four Republicans. I do not say that I am precisely accurate in their numbers, but I am sufficiently so for any use I am making of it.

Why is it that twenty shall be entitled to all the credit of doing that work, and the hundred none of it?

Why, if, as Judge Douglas says, the honor is to be divided and due credit is to be given to other parties, why is just so much given as is consonant with the wishes, the interests and advancement of the twenty? My understanding is, when a common job is done, or a common enterprise prosecuted, if I put in five dollars to your one, I have a right to take out five dollars to your one. But he does not so understand it. He declares the dividend of credit for defeating Lecompton upon a basis which seems unprecedented and incomprehensible.

Let us see. Lecompton in the raw was defeated. It afterward took a sort of cooked up shape, and was passed in the English bill. It is said by the Judge that the defeat was a good and proper thing. If it was a good thing, why is he entitled to more credit than others, for the performance of that good act, unless there was something in the antecedents of the Republicans that might induce every one to expect them to join in that good work, and at the same time, something leading them to doubt that he would? Does he place his superior claim to credit, on the ground that he performed a good act which was never expected of him? He says I have a proneness for quoting scripture. If I should do so now, it occurs that perhaps he places himself somewhat upon the ground of the parable of the lost sheep which went astray upon the mountains, and when the owner of the hundred sheep found the one that was lost, and threw it upon his shoulders, and came home rejoicing, it was said that there was more rejoicing over the one sheep that was lost and had been found, than over the ninety and nine in the fold. The application is made by the Saviour in this parable, thus: "Verily, I say unto you, there is more rejoicing in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, than over ninety and nine just persons that need no repentance."

And now, if the Judge claims the benefit of this parable, *let him repent*. Let him not come up here and say: "I am the only person; and you are the

ninety-nine sinners!" *Repentance* before *forgiveness* is a provision of the Christian system, and on that condition alone will the Republicans grant his forgiveness.

How will he prove that we have ever occupied a different position in regard to the Lecompton Constitution or any principle in it? He says he did not make his opposition on the ground as to whether it was a free or slave Constitution, and he would have you understand that the Republicans made their opposition because it ultimately became a slave Constitution. To make proof in favor of himself on this point, he reminds us that he opposed Lecompton before the vote was taken declaring whether the State was to be free or slave. But he forgets to say that our Republican Senator, Trumbull, made a speech against Lecompton even before he did.

Why did he oppose it? Partly, as he declares, because the members of the Convention who framed it were not fairly elected by the people; that the people were not allowed to vote unless they had been registered; and that the people of whole counties, in some instances, were not registered. For these reasons he declares the Constitution was not an emanation, in any true sense, from the people. He also has an additional objection as to the mode of submitting the Constitution back to the people. But bearing on the question of whether the delegates were fairly elected, a speech of his, made something more than twelve months ago, from this stand, becomes important. It was made a little while before the election of the delegates who made Lecompton. In that speech he declared there was every reason to hope and believe the election would be fair; and if any one failed to vote, it would be his own culpable fault.

I, a few days after, made a sort of answer to that speech. In that answer, I made substantially, the very argument with which he combatted his Lecompton adversaries in the Senate last winter. I pointed to the facts that the people could not vote without being regis-

tered, and that the time for registering had gone by. I commented on it as wonderful that Judge Douglas could be ignorant of these facts, which every one else in the nation so well knew.

I now pass from popular sovereignty and Lecompton. I may have occasion to refer to one or both.

When he was preparing his plan of campaign, Napoleon-like, in New York, as appears by two speeches I have heard him deliver since his arrival in Illinois, he gave special attention to a speech of mine, delivered here on the 16th of June last. He says that he carefully read that speech. He told us that at Chicago a week ago last night, and he repeated it at Bloomington last night. Doubtless, he repeated it again to-day, though I did not hear him. In the two first places—Chicago and Bloomington—I heard him; to-day I did not. He said he had carefully examined that speech; *when*, he did not say; but there is no reasonable doubt it was when he was in New York preparing his plan of campaign. I am glad he did read it carefully. He says it was evidently prepared with great care. I freely admit that it was prepared with care. I claim not to be more free from errors than others—perhaps scarcely so much; but I was careful not to put anything in that speech as a matter of fact, or make any inferences which did not appear to be true, and fully warrantable. If I had made any mistake I was willing to be corrected; if I had drawn any inference in regard to Judge Douglas, or any one else, which was not warranted, I was fully prepared to modify it as soon as discovered. I planted myself upon the truth and the truth only, so far as I knew it, or could be brought to know it.

Having made that speech with the most kindly feelings toward Judge Douglas, as manifested therein, I was gratified when I found that he had carefully examined it, and had detected no error of fact, nor any inference against him, nor any misrepresentations, of which he thought fit to complain. In neither of the two speeches I have mentioned, did he make any such

complaint. I will thank any one who will inform me that he, in his speech to-day, pointed out anything I had stated, respecting him, as being erroneous. I presume there is no such thing. I have reason to be gratified that the care and caution used in that speech, left it so that he, most of all others interested in discovering error, has not been able to point out one thing against him which he could say was wrong. He seizes upon the doctrines he supposes to be included in that speech, and declares that upon them will turn the issues of this campaign. He then quotes, or attempts to quote, from my speech. I will not say that he wilfully misquotes, but he does fail to quote accurately. His attempt at quoting is from a passage which I believe I can quote accurately from memory. I shall make the quotation now, with some comments upon it, as I have already said, in order that the Judge shall be left entirely without excuse for misrepresenting me. I do so now, as I hope, for the last time. I do this in great caution, in order that if he repeats his misrepresentation, it shall be plain to all that he does so wilfully. If, after all, he still persists, I shall be compelled to reconstruct the course I have marked out for myself, and draw upon such humble resources as I have, for a new course, better suited to the real exigencies of the case. I set out, in this campaign, with the intention of conducting it strictly as a gentleman, in substance at least, if not in the outside polish. The latter I shall never be, but that which constitutes the inside of a gentleman I hope I understand, and am not less inclined to practice than others. It was my purpose and expectation that this canvass would be conducted upon principle, and with fairness on both sides, and it shall not be my fault if this purpose and expectation shall be given up.

He charges, in substance, that I invite a war of sections; that I propose all the local institutions of the different States shall become consolidated and uniform. What is there in the language of that speech which expresses such purpose, or bears such construction? I

have again and again said that I would not enter into any of the States to disturb the institution of slavery. Judge Douglas said, at Bloomington, that I used language most able and ingenious for concealing what I really meant; and that while I had protested against entering into the slave States, I nevertheless did mean to go on the banks of the Ohio and throw missiles into Kentucky, to disturb them in their domestic institutions.

I said, in that speech, and I meant no more, that the institution of slavery ought to be placed in the very attitude where the framers of this Government placed it and left it. I do not understand that the framers of our Constitution left the people of the free States in the attitude of firing bombs or shells into the slave States. I was not using that passage for the purpose for which he infers I did use it. I said: "We are now advanced into the fifth year since a policy was created for the avowed object and with the confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not cease till a crisis shall have been reached and passed. 'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe that this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South."

Now you all see, from that quotation, I did not express my *wish* on anything. In that passage I indicated no wish or purpose of my own; I simply expressed my *expectation*. Cannot the Judge perceive a distinction between a *purpose* and an *expectation*? I have often expressed an expectation to die, but I have never expressed a *wish* to die. I said at Chicago, and now repeat, that I am quite aware this Government has endured, half slave and half free, for eighty-two years.

I understand that little bit of history. I expressed the opinion I did, because I perceived—or thought I perceived—a new set of causes introduced. I did say at Chicago, in my speech there, that I do wish to see the spread of slavery arrested, and to see it placed where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction. I said that because I supposed, when the public mind shall rest in that belief, we shall have peace on the slavery question. I have believed—and now believe—the public mind did rest on that belief up to the introduction of the Nebraska bill.

Although I have ever been opposed to slavery, so far I rested in the hope and belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. For that reason it had been a minor question with me. I might have been mistaken; but I had believed, and now believe, that the whole public mind, that is, the mind of the great majority, had rested in that belief up to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. But upon that event, I became convinced that either I had been resting in a delusion, or the institution was being placed on a new basis—a basis for making it perpetual, national and universal. I believe that bill to be the beginning of a conspiracy for that purpose. So believing, I have since then considered that question a paramount one. So believing, I thought the public mind will never rest till the power of Congress to restrict the spread of it shall again be acknowledged and exercised on the one hand, or on the other, all resistance be entirely crushed out. I have expressed that opinion, and I entertain it to-night. It is denied that there is any tendency to the nationalization of slavery in these States.

Mr. Brooks, of South Carolina, in one of his speeches, when they were presenting him canes, silver plate, gold pitchers and the like, for assaulting Senator Sumner, distinctly affirmed his opinion that when this Constitution was formed, it was the belief of no man that slavery would last to the present day.

He said, what I think, that the framers of our Con-

stitution placed the institution of slavery where the public mind rested in the hope that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. But he went on to say that the men of the present age, by their experience, have become wiser than the framers of the Constitution; and the invention of the cotton gin had made the perpetuity of slavery a necessity in this country.

As another piece of evidence tending to this same point: Quite recently in Virginia, a man—the owner of slaves—made a will providing that after his death certain of his slaves should have their freedom if they should so choose, and go to Liberia, rather than remain in slavery. They chose to be liberated. But the persons to whom they would descend as property, claimed them as slaves. A suit was instituted, which finally came to the Supreme Court of Virginia, and was therein decided against the slaves, upon the ground that a negro cannot make a choice—that they had no legal power to choose—could not perform the condition upon which their freedom depended.

I do not mention this with any purpose of criticising it, but to connect it with the arguments as affording additional evidence of the change of sentiment upon this question of slavery in the direction of making it perpetual and national. I argue now as I did before, that there is such a tendency, and I am backed not merely by the facts, but by the open confession in the slave States.

And now, as to the Judge's inference, that because I wish to see slavery placed in the course of ultimate extinction—placed where our fathers originally placed it—I wish to annihilate the State Legislatures—to force cotton to grow upon the tops of the Green Mountains—to freeze ice in Florida—to cut lumber on the broad Illinois prairies—that I am in favor of all these ridiculous and impossible things.

It seems to me it is a complete answer to all this to ask, if, when Congress did have the fashion of restricting slavery from free territory; when courts did have the fashion of deciding that taking a slave into a free

country made him free—I say it is a sufficient answer to ask, if any of this ridiculous nonsense about consolidation, and uniformity, did actually follow? Who heard of any such thing, because of the Ordinance of '87? because of the Missouri Restriction? because of the numerous court decisions of that character?

Now as to the Dred Scott decision; for upon that he makes his last point at me. He boldly takes ground in favor of that decision.

This is one-half the onslaught, and one-third of the entire plan of the campaign. I am opposed to that decision in a certain sense, but not in the sense which he puts on it. I say that in so far as it decided in favor of Dred Scott's master, and against Dred Scott and his family, I do not propose to disturb or resist the decision.

I never have proposed to do any such thing. I think, that in respect for judicial authority, my humble history would not suffer in comparison with that of Judge Douglas. He would have the citizen conform his vote to that decision; the member of Congress, his; the President, his use of the veto power. He would make it a rule of political action for the people and all the departments of the Government. I would not. By resisting it as a political rule I disturb no right of property, create no disorder, excite no mobs.

When he spoke at Chicago, on Friday evening of last week, he made this same point upon me. On Saturday evening I replied, and reminded him of a Supreme Court decision which he opposed for at least several years. Last night, at Bloomington, he took some notice of that reply; but entirely forgot to remember that part of it.

He renews his onslaught upon me, forgetting to remember that I have turned the tables against himself on that very point. I renew the effort to draw his attention to it. I wish to stand erect before the country, as well as Judge Douglas, on this question of judicial authority; and therefore I add something to the authority in favor of my own position. I wish to show that I am sustained by authority, in addition to that hereto-

fore presented. I do not expect to convince the Judge. It is part of the plan of his campaign, and he will cling to it with a desperate gripe. Even, turn it upon him—the sharp point against him, and gaff him through—he will still cling to it till he can invent some new dodge to take the place of it.

In public speaking it is tedious reading from documents; but I must beg to indulge the practice to a limited extent. I shall read from a letter written by Mr. Jefferson in 1820, and now to be found in the seventh volume of his correspondence, at page 177. It seems he had been presented by a gentleman of the name of Jarvis with a book, or essay, or periodical, called the “Republican,” and he was writing in acknowledgment of the present, and noting some of its contents. After expressing the hope that the work will produce a favorable effect upon the minds of the young, he proceeds to say :

“That it will have this tendency may be expected, and for that reason I feel an urgency to note what I deem an error in it, the more requiring notice as your opinion is strengthened by that of many others. You seem, in page 84 and 148, to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions—a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges are as honest as other men, and not more so. They have, with others, the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. Their maxim is, ‘boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem;’ and their power is the more dangerous as they are in office for life, and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control. The constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that, to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots. It has more wisely made all the departments coequal and cosovereign with themselves.”

Thus we see the power claimed for the Supreme Court

by Judge Douglas, Mr. Jefferson holds, would reduce us to the despotism of an oligarchy.

Now, I have said no more than this—in fact, never quite so much as this—at least I am sustained by Mr. Jefferson.

Let us go a little further. You remember we once had a National Bank. Some one owed the bank a debt; he was sued and sought to avoid payment, on the ground that the bank was unconstitutional. The case went to the Supreme Court, and therein it was decided that the bank was constitutional. The whole Democratic party revolted against that decision. General Jackson himself asserted that he, as President, would not be bound to hold a National Bank to be constitutional, even though the court had decided it to be so. He fell in precisely with the view of Mr. Jefferson, and acted upon it under his official oath, in vetoing a charter for a National Bank. The declaration that Congress does not possess this constitutional power to charter a bank, has gone into the Democratic platform, at their National Convention, and was brought forward and reaffirmed in their last Convention at Cincinnati. They have contended for that declaration, in the very teeth of the Supreme Court, for more than a quarter of a century. In fact, they have reduced the decision to an absolute nullity. That decision, I repeat, is repudiated in the Cincinnati platform; and still, as if to show that effrontery can go no farther, Judge Douglas vaunts in the very speeches in which he denounces me for opposing the Dred Scott decision, that he stands on the Cincinnati platform.

Now I wish to know what the Judge can charge upon me, with respect to decisions of the Supreme Court, which does not lie in all its length, breath, and proportions at his own door. The plain truth is simply this: Judge Douglas is *for* Supreme Court decisions when he likes and against them when he does not like them. He is for the Dred Scott decision because it tends to nationalize slavery—because it is part of the original combination for that object. It so happens, singularly enough, that I never stood opposed to a decision of the supreme

Court till this. On the contrary, I have no recollection that he was ever particularly in favor of one till this. He never was in favor of any, nor opposed to any, till the present one, which helps to nationalize slavery.

Free men of Sangamon—free men of Illinois—free men everywhere—judge ye between him and me, upon this issue.

He says this Dred Scott case is a very small matter at most—that it has no practical effect; that at best, or rather, I suppose, at worst, it is but an abstraction. I submit that the proposition that the thing which determines whether a man is free or a slave, is rather *concrete* than *abstract*. I think you would conclude that it was, if your liberty depended upon it, and so would Judge Douglas if his liberty depended upon it. But suppose it was on the question of spreading slavery over the new Territories that he considers it as being merely an abstract matter, and one of no practical importance. How has the planting of slavery in new countries always been effected? It has now been decided that slavery cannot be kept out of our new Territories by any legal means. In what do our new Territories now differ in this respect from the old Colonies when slavery was first planted within them? It was planted as Mr. Clay once declared, and as history proves true, by individual men in spite of the wishes of the people; the Mother Government refusing to prohibit it, and withholding from the people of the Colonies the authority to prohibit it for themselves. Mr. Clay says this was one of the great and just causes of complaint against Great Britain by the Colonies, and the best apology we can now make for having the institution amongst us. In that precise condition our Nebraska politicians have at last succeeded in placing our own new Territories; the Government will not prohibit slavery within them, nor allow the people to prohibit it.

I defy any man to find any difference between the policy which originally planted slavery in these Colonies and that policy which now prevails in our new Territories. If it does not go into them, it is only because

no individual wishes it to go. The Judge indulged himself, doubtless to-day, with the question as to what I am going to do with or about the Dred Scott decision. Well, Judge, will you please tell me what you did about the bank decision? Will you not graciously allow us to do with the Dred Scott decision precisely as you did with the bank decision? You succeeded in breaking down the moral effect of that decision; did you find it necessary to amend the Constitution? or to set up a court of negroes in order to do it?

There is one other point. Judge Douglas has a very affectionate leaning toward the Americans and Old Whigs. Last evening, in a sort of weeping tone, he described to us a death-bed scene. He had been called to the side of Mr. Clay, in his last moments, in order that the genius of "popular sovereignty" might duly descend from the dying man and settle upon him, the living and most worthy successor. He could do no less than promise that he would devote the remainder of his life to "popular sovereignty;" and then the great statesman departs in peace. By this part of the "plan of the campaign," the Judge has evidently promised himself that tears shall be drawn down the cheeks of all Old Whigs, as large as half-grown apples.

Mr. Webster, too, was mentioned; but it did not quite come to a death-bed scene, as to him. It would be amusing, if it were not disgusting, to see how quick these compromise-breakers administer on the political effects of their dead adversaries, trumping up claims never before heard of, and dividing the assets among themselves. If I should be found dead to-morrow morning, nothing but my insignificance could prevent a speech being made on my authority before the end of next week. It so happens that in that "popular sovereignty" with which Mr. Clay was identified, the Missouri Compromise was expressly reserved; and it was a little singular, if Mr. Clay cast his mantle upon Judge Douglas on purpose to have that compromise repealed.

Again, the Judge did not keep faith with Mr. Clay when he first brought in his Nebraska bill. He left the

Missouri Compromise unrepealed, and in his report accompanying the bill, he told the world he did it on purpose. The manes of Mr. Clay must have been in great agony, till thirty days later, when "popular sovereignty" stood forth in all its glory.

One more thing. Last night Judge Douglas tormented himself with horrors about my disposition to make negroes perfectly equal with white men in social and political relations. He did not stop to show that I have said any such thing, or that it legitimately follows from any thing I have said, but he rushes on with his assertions. I adhere to the Declaration of Independence. If Judge Douglas and his friends are not willing to stand by it, let them come up and amend it. Let them make it read that all men are created equal except negroes. Let us have it decided, whether the Declaration of Independence, in this blessed year of 1858, shall be thus amended. In his construction of the Declaration last year, he said it only meant that Americans in America were equal to Englishmen in England. Then, when I pointed out to him that by that rule he excludes the Germans, the Irish, the Portuguese, and all the other people who have come amongst us since the Revolution, he reconstructs his construction. In his last speech he tells us it meant Europeans.

I press him a little further, and ask if it meant to include the Russians in Asia? or does he mean to exclude that vast population from the principles of our Declaration of Independence? I expect ere long he will introduce another amendment to his definition. He is not at all particular. He is satisfied with any thing which does not endanger the nationalizing of negro slavery. It may draw white men down, but it must not lift negroes up. Who shall say, "I am the superior, and you are the inferior?"

My declarations upon this subject of negro slavery may be misrepresented, but cannot be misunderstood. I have said that I do not understand the Declaration to mean that all men were created equal in all respects. They are not our equal in color; but I suppose that it

does mean to declare that all men are equal in some respects; they are equal in their right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Certainly the negro is not our equal in color—perhaps not in many other respects; still, in the right to put into his mouth the bread that his own hands have earned, he is the equal of every other man, white or black. In pointing out that more has been given you, you cannot be justified in taking away the little which has been given him. All I ask for the negro is that if you do not like him, let him alone. If God gave him but little, that little let him enjoy.

When our Government was established, we had the institution of slavery among us. We were in a certain sense compelled to tolerate its existence. It was a sort of necessity. We had gone through our struggle and secured our own independence. The framers of the Constitution found the institution of slavery amongst their other institutions at the time. They found that by an effort to eradicate it, they might lose much of what they had already gained. They were obliged to bow to the necessity. They gave power to Congress to abolish the slave trade at the end of twenty years. They also prohibited it in the Territories where it did not exist. They did what they could and yielded to the necessity for the rest. I also yield to all which follows from that necessity. What I would most desire would be the separation of the white and black races.

One more point on this Springfield speech which Judge Douglas says he has read so carefully. I expressed my belief in the existence of a conspiracy to perpetuate and nationalize slavery. I did not profess to know it, nor do I now. I showed the part Judge Douglas had played in the string of facts, constituting to my mind the proof of that conspiracy. I showed the parts played by others.

I charged that the people had been deceived into carrying the last Presidential election, by the impression that the people of the Territories might exclude slavery if they choose, when it was known in advance by the conspirators, that the court was to decide that neither

Congress nor the people could so exclude slavery. These charges are more distinctly made than anything else in the speech.

Judge Douglas has carefully read and re-read that speech. He has not, so far as I know, contradicted those charges. In the two speeches which I heard, he certainly did not. On his own tacit admission I renew that charge. I charge him with having been a party to that conspiracy and to that deception for the sole purpose of nationalizing slavery.

After this speech the following correspondence took place between the two rival candidates for the United States Senate:—

Mr. Lincoln to Mr. Douglas.

CHICAGO, ILL., July 24, 1858.

Hon. S. A. DOUGLAS—*My Dear Sir:* Will it be agreeable to you to make an arrangement for you and myself to divide time, and address the same audiences the present canvass? Mr. Judd, who will hand you this, is authorized to receive your answer; and, if agreeable to you, to enter into the terms of such arrangement.

Your obedient servant,

A LINCOLN.

Mr. Douglas to Mr. Lincoln.

CHICAGO, July 24, 1858.

Hon. A. LINCOLN—*Dear Sir:* Your note of this date, in which you inquire if it would be agreeable to me to make an arrangement to divide the time and address the same audiences during the present canvass, was handed me by Mr. Judd. Recent events have interposed difficulties in the way of such an arrangement.

I went to Springfield last week for the purpose of conferring with the Democratic State Central Committee upon the mode of conducting the canvass, and with them, and under their advice, made a list of appointments covering the entire period until late in October. The people of the several localities have been notified of the times and places of the meetings. Those appointments have all been made for Democratic meetings, and arrangements have been made by which the Democratic candidates for Congress, for the Legislature, and other offices, will be present and address the people. It is evident, therefore, that these various candidates, in connexion with myself, will occupy the whole time of the day and evening, and leave no opportunity for other speeches.

Besides, there is another consideration which should be kept in mind. It has been suggested recently that an arrangement had been made to bring out a third candidate for the United States Senate, who, with yourself, should canvass the state in opposition to me, and with no other purpose than to insure my defeat, by dividing the Democratic party for your benefit. If I should make this arrangement with you, it is more than probable that this other candidate, who has a common object with you, would desire to become a party to it, and claim the right to speak from the same stand; so that he and you, in concert, might be able to take the opening and closing speech in every case.

I cannot refrain from expressing my surprise, if it was your original intention to invite such an arrangement, that you should have waited until after I had made my appointments, inasmuch as we were both in Chicago together for several days after my arrival, and again at Bloomington, Atlanta, Lincoln, and Springfield, where it was well known I went for the purpose of consulting with the State Central Committee, and agreeing upon the plan of the campaign.

While, under these circumstances, I do not feel at liberty to make any arrangements which would deprive the Democratic candidates for Congress, State officers, and the Legislature from participating in the discussion

at the various meetings designated by the Democratic State Central Committee, I will, in order to accommodate you as far as it is in my power to do so, take the responsibility of making an arrangement with you for a discussion between us at one prominent point in each Congressional District in the State, except the second and sixth districts, where we have both spoken, and in each of which cases you had the concluding speech. If agreeable to you, I will indicate the following places as those most suitable in the several Congressional Districts at which we should speak, to wit: Freeport, Ottawa, Galesburg, Quincy, Alton, Jonesboro and Charleston. I will confer with you at the earliest convenient opportunity in regard to the mode of conducting the debate, the times of meeting at the several places, subject to the condition, that where appointments have already been made by the Democratic State Central Committee at any of those places, I must insist upon you meeting me at the times specified.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

S. A. DOUGLAS.

Mr. Lincoln to Mr. Douglas.

SPRINGFIELD, July 29, 1858.

HON. S. A. DOUGLAS—*Dear Sir:* Yours of the 24th in relation to an arrangement to divide time, and address the same audiences, is received; and, in apology for not sooner replying, allow me to say, that when I sat by you at dinner yesterday, I was not aware that you had answered my note, nor, certainly, that my own note had been presented to you. An hour after, I saw a copy of your answer in the Chicago Times, and, reaching home, I found the original awaiting me. Protesting that your insinuations of attempted unfairness on my part are unjust, and with the hope that you did not very considerably make them, I proceed to reply. To

your statement that "It has been suggested, recently, that an arrangement had been made to bring out a third candidate for the U. S. Senate, who, with yourself, should canvass the State in opposition to me," etc., I can only say, that such suggestion must have been made by yourself, for certainly none such has been made by or to me, or otherwise, to my knowledge. Surely you did not *deliberately* conclude, as you insinuate, that I was expecting to draw you into an arrangement of terms, to be agreed on by yourself, by which a third candidate and myself, "in concert, might be able to take the opening and closing speech in every case."

As to your surprise that I did not sooner make the proposal to divide time with you, I can only say, I made it as soon as I resolved to make it. I did not know but that such proposal would come from you; I waited, respectfully, to see. It may have been well known to you that you went to Springfield for the purpose of agreeing on the plan of campaign; but it was not so known to me. When your appointments were announced in the papers, extending only to the 21st of August, I, for the first time, considered it certain that you would make no proposal to me, and then resolved that, if my friends concurred, I would make one to you. As soon thereafter as I could see and consult with friends satisfactorily, I did make the proposal. It did not occur to me that the proposed arrangement could derange your plans after the latest of your appointments already made. After that, there was, before the election, largely over two months of clear time.

For you to say that we have already spoken at Chicago and Springfield, and that on both occasions I had the concluding speech, is hardly a fair statement. The truth rather is this: At Chicago, July 9th, you made a carefully-prepared conclusion on my speech of June 16th. Twenty-four hours after, I made a hasty conclusion on yours of the 9th. You had six days to prepare, and concluded on me again at Bloomington on the 16th. Twenty-four hours after, I concluded again on you at Springfield. In the meantime, you had made another

conclusion on me at Springfield, which I did not hear, and of the contents of which I knew nothing when I spoke; so that your speech made in daylight, and mine at night, of the 17th, at Springfield, were both made in perfect independence of each other. The dates of making all these speeches will show, I think, that in the matter of time for preparation, the advantage has all been on your side; and that none of the external circumstances have stood to my advantage.

I agree to an arrangement for us to speak at the seven places you have named, and at your own times, provided you name the times at once, so that I, as well as you, can have to myself the time not covered by the arrangement. As to the other details, I wish perfect reciprocity, and no more. I wish as much time as you, and that conclusions shall alternate. That is all.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

P. S. As matters now stand, I shall be at no more of your exclusive meetings; and for about a week from to-day a letter from you will reach me at Springfield.

A. L.

Mr. Douglas to Mr. Lincoln.

BEMENT, PLATT CO., ILL. July 30, 1858.

Dear Sir: Your letter, dated yesterday, accepting my proposition for a joint discussion at one prominent point in each Congressional District, as stated in my previous letter, was received this morning.

The times and places designated are as follows:

Ottawa, La Salle County . . .	August	21st, 1858.
Freeport, Stephenson County . . .	"	27th, "
Jonesboro, Union County . . .	September	15th, "
Charleston, Coles County . . .	"	18th, "
Galesburgh, Knox County . . .	October	7th, "
Quincy, Adams County . . .	"	13th, "
Alton, Madison County . . .	"	15th, "

I agree to your suggestion that we shall alternately open and close the discussion. I will speak at Ottawa one hour, you can reply, occupying an hour and a half, and I will then follow for half an hour. At Freeport, you shall open the discussion and speak one hour, I will follow for an hour and a half, and you can then reply for half an hour. We will alternate in like manner in each successive place.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. A. DOUGLAS.

HON. A. LINCOLN, Springfield, Ill.

Mr. Lincoln to Mr. Douglas.

SPRINGFIELD, July 31, 1858.

HON. S. A. DOUGLAS—*Dear Sir:* Yours of yesterday, naming places, times and terms, for joint discussions between us, was received this morning. Although by the terms, as you propose, you take *four* openings and closes, to my *three*, I accede, and thus close the arrangement. I direct this to you at Hillsboro, and shall try to have both your letter and this appear in the *Journal* and *Register* of Monday morning.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

In the course of the debates which ensued, Mr. Douglas gave the following account of the early rivalry between himself and Mr. Lincoln, and of the circumstances in which the boyhood and the youth of them both were trained. In no other country in the world could two prominent men relate such experiences; in no other country would they, if they could; no where else could two men rise from such absolute obscurity to

such absolute distinction so rapidly, and surely, and naturally, and easily; no where else, if the rise should occur, would the men be other than ashamed of what is here their proudest boast.

In the remarks I have made on this platform, and the position of Mr. Lincoln upon it, I mean nothing personally disrespectful or unkind to that gentleman. I have known him for nearly twenty-five years. There were many points of sympathy between us when we first got acquainted. We were both comparatively boys, and both struggling with poverty in a strange land. I was a school-teacher in the town of Winchester, and he a flourishing grocery-keeper in the town of Salem. He was more successful in his occupation than I was in mine, and hence more fortunate in this world's goods. Lincoln is one of those peculiar men who perform with admirable skill everything which they undertake. I made as good a school-teacher as I could, and when a cabinet maker I made a good bedstead and tables, although my old boss said I succeeded better with bureaus and secretaries than with anything else; but I believe that Lincoln was always more successful in business than I, for his business enabled him to get into the Legislature. I met him there, however, and had a sympathy with him, because of the up-hill struggle we both had in life. He was then just as good at telling an anecdote as now. He could beat any of the boys wrestling, or running a foot-race, in pitching quoits or tossing a copper; could ruin more liquor than all the boys of the town together, and the dignity and impartiality with which he presided at a horse-race or fist-fight, excited the admiration and won the praise of everybody that was present and participated. I sympathized with him, because he was struggling with difficulties, and so was I. Mr. Lincoln served with me in the Legislature in 1836, when we both retired, and he subsided, or became submerged, and he was lost sight of as a public man for some years. In 1846, when

Wilmot introduced his celebrated proviso, and the Abolition tornado swept over the country, Lincoln again turned up as a member of Congress from the Sangamon district. I was then in the Senate of the United States, and was glad to welcome my old friend and companion. Whilst in Congress, he distinguished himself by his opposition to the Mexican war, taking the side of the common enemy against his own country; and when he returned home he found that the indignation of the people followed him everywhere, and he was again submerged or obliged to retire into private life, forgotten by his former friends. He came up again in 1854, just in time to make this Abolition or Black Republican platform, in company with Giddings, Lovejoy, Chase and Fred Douglass, for the Republican party to stand upon.

In reply to this account, Lincoln said:

Now I pass on to consider one or two more of these little follies. The Judge is wofully at fault about his early friend Lincoln being a "grocery-keeper." I don't know as it would be a great sin, if I had been; but he is mistaken. Lincoln never kept a grocery anywhere in the world. It is true that Lincoln did work the latter part of one winter in a little still-house, up at the head of a hollow. And so I think my friend, the Judge, is equally at fault when he charges me, at the time when I was in Congress, of having opposed our soldiers who were fighting in the Mexican war. The Judge did not make his charge very distinctly, but I can tell you what he can prove, by referring to the record. You remember I was an old Whig, and whenever the Democratic party tried to get me to vote that the war had been righteously begun by the President, I would not do it. But whenever they asked for any money, or land-warrants, or anything to pay the soldiers there during all that time, I gave the same vote that Judge Douglas did. You can think as you please as to whether that was consistent. Such is the truth; and the Judge has the right to

make all he can out of it. But when he, by a general charge, conveys the idea that I withheld supplies from the soldiers who were fighting in the Mexican war, or did anything else to hinder the soldiers, he is, to say the least, grossly and altogether mistaken, as a consultation of the records will prove to him.

The record in this volume, the speeches quoted in its earlier portion, fully corroborate the statement of Mr. Lincoln in regard to his Congressional career.

In reply to some more serious charges, made at the same time by Senator Douglas, Mr. Lincoln said :

MY FELLOW-CITIZENS: When a man hears himself somewhat misrepresented, it provokes him—at least, I find it so with myself; but when misrepresentation becomes very gross and palpable, it is more apt to amuse him. The first thing I see fit to notice, is the fact that Judge Douglas alleges, after running through the history of the old Democratic and the old Whig parties, that Judge Trumbull and myself made an arrangement in 1854, by which I was to have the place of Gen. Shields in the United States Senate, and Judge Trumbull was to have the place of Judge Douglas. Now, all I have to say upon that subject is, that I think no man—not even Judge Douglas—can prove it, *because it is not true*. I have no doubt he is “*conscientious*” in saying it. As to those resolutions that he took such a length of time to read, as being the platform of the Republican party in 1854, I say I never had anything to do with them, and I think Trumbull never had. Judge Douglas cannot show that either of us ever did have anything to do with them. I believe *this* is true about those resolutions: There was a call for a Convention to form a Republican party at Springfield, and I think that my friend, Mr. Lovejoy, who is here upon this stand, had a hand in it. I think this is true, and I think if he will remember accurately, he will be able to recollect that he tried to get me into it, and I would not go in. I believe it is also true that I

went away from Springfield when the Convention was in session, to attend court, in Tazewell County. It is true they did place my name, though without authority, upon the committee, and afterward wrote me to attend the meeting of the committee, but I refused to do so, and I never had anything to do with that organization. This is the plain truth about all that matter of the resolutions.

Now, about this story that Judge Douglas tells of Trumbull bargaining to sell out the old Democratic party, and Lincoln agreeing to sell out the old Whig party, I have the means of *knowing* about that—Judge Douglas cannot have; and I know there is no substance to it whatever. Yet I have no doubt he is “*conscientious*” about it. I know that after Mr. Lovejoy got into the Legislature that winter, he complained of me that I had told all the old Whigs of his district that the old Whig party was good enough for them, and some of them voted against him because I told* them so. Now, I have no means of totally disproving such charges as this which the Judge makes. A man cannot prove a negative, but he has a right to claim that when a man makes an affirmative charge, he must offer some proof to show the truth of what he says. I certainly cannot introduce testimony to show the negative about things, but I have a right to claim that if a man says he *knows* a thing, then he must show *how* he knows it. I always have a right to claim this, and it is not satisfactory to me that he may be “*conscientious*” on the subject.

In one of his speeches Judge Douglas propounded a series of questions to his antagonist, which the latter thus directly answered.

Having said thus much, I will take up the Judge’s interrogatories as I find them printed in the *Chicago Times*, and answer them *seriatim*. In order that there may be no mistake about it, I have copied the interrogatories in writing, and also my answers to them. The first one of these interrogatories is in these words:

Question 1. "I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands, as he did in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law?"

Answer. I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law.

Q. 2. "I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day, as he did in 1854, against the admission of any more slave States into the Union, even if the people want them?"

A. I do not now, or ever did, stand pledged against the admission of any more slave States into the Union.

Q. 3. "I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union with such a Constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make?"

A. I do not stand pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union, with such a Constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make.

Q. 4. "I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia?"

A. I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

Q. 5. "I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States?"

A. I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States.

Q. 6. "I desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States, North as well as South of the Missouri Compromise line?"

A. I am impliedly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief in the *right* and *duty* of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United States Territories.

Q. 7. "I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition of any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein?"

A. I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory; and, in any given case, I would or would

not oppose such acquisition, accordingly as I might think such acquisition would or would not aggravate the slavery question among ourselves.

This series will aid materially in forming an idea of the position that Mr. Lincoln to-day claims to occupy on the important questions at issue before the country ; for although he does not now in person, as before, defend his opinions and maintain his views in the presence of those who are to decide his political fortunes, he is just as really on trial as in 1858 ; his former opinions and the doctrines he then advanced are still maintained by him, are those by which he will again be judged, and by which he and his party are to stand or fall. They do not shirk the issue.

Mr. Lincoln's views in regard to the Dred Scott decision will be found very succinctly stated in the following extract from one of his speeches, made by him during the campaign. It was delivered at Chicago on the 10th of July.

A little now on the other point—the Dred Scott decision. Another of the issues, he says, that is to be made with me, is upon his devotion to the Dred Scott decision, and my opposition to it.

I have expressed heretofore, and I now repeat my opposition to the Dred Scott decision, but I should be allowed to state the nature of that opposition, and I ask your indulgence while I do so. What is fairly implied by the term Judge Douglas has used, “resistance to the decision?” I do not resist it. If I wanted to take Dred Scott from his master, I would be interfering with property, and that terrible difficulty that Judge Douglas speaks of, of interfering with property would arise. But I am doing no such thing as that, but all that I am doing is refusing to obey it as a political rule. If I were in Congress, and a vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new Territory,

in spite of the Dred Scott decision, I would vote that it should.

Mr. Lincoln—That is what I would do. Judge Douglas said last night, that before the decision he might advance his opinion, and it might be contrary to the decision when it was made; but after it was made he would abide by it until it was reversed. Just so! We let this property abide by the decision, but we will try to reverse that decision. We will try to put it where Judge Douglas would not object, for he says he will obey it until it is reversed. Somebody has to reverse that decision, since it is made, and we mean to reverse it, and we mean to do it peaceably.

What are the uses of decisions of courts? They have two uses. As rules of property they have two uses. First—they decide upon the question before the court. They decide in this case that Dred Scott is a slave. Nobody resists that. Not only that, but they say to everybody else, that persons standing just as Dred Scott stands, is as he is. That is, they say that when a question comes up upon another person, it will be so decided again, unless the court decides in another way, unless the court overrules its decision. Well, we mean to do what we can to have the court decide the other way. That is one thing we mean to try to do.

The sacredness that Judge Douglas throws around this decision, is a degree of sacredness that has never been before thrown around any other decision. I have never heard of such a thing. Why decisions apparently contrary to that decision, or that good lawyers thought were contrary to that decision, have been made by that very court before. It is the first of its kind; it is an astonisher in legal history. It is a new wonder of the world. It is based upon falsehood in the main as to the facts—allegations of facts upon which it stands are not facts at all in many instances, and no decision made on any question—the first instance of a decision made under so many unfavorable circumstances—thus placed, has ever been held by the profession as law, and it has always needed confirmation before the lawyers regarded it as settled law.

But Judge Douglas will have it that all hands must take this extraordinary decision, made under these extraordinary circumstances, and give their vote in Congress in accordance with it, yield to it and obey it in every possible sense. Circumstances alter cases. Do not gentlemen here remember the case of that same Supreme Court, some twenty-five or thirty years ago, deciding that a National Bank was constitutional? I ask, if somebody does not remember that a National Bank was declared to be constitutional? Such is the truth, whether it be remembered or not. The Bank charter ran out, and a re-charter was granted by Congress. That re-charter was laid before General Jackson. It was urged upon him, when he denied the constitutionality of the Bank, that the Supreme Court had decided that it was constitutional; and that General Jackson then said that the Supreme Court had no right to lay down a rule to govern a co-ordinate branch of the Government, the members of which had sworn to support the Constitution—that each member had sworn to support that Constitution, as he understood it. I will venture here to say, that I have heard Judge Douglas say that he approved of General Jackson for that act. What has now become of all his tirade about “resistance to the Supreme Court?”

The following tribute to the Declaration of Independence was delivered by Mr. Lincoln during the campaign, but not on any occasion when his competitor was present. It is in a higher strain than Mr. Lincoln often attempted, but its success would warrant a renewal.

These communities (the thirteen colonies), by their representatives in old Independence Hall, said to the world of men: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are born equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” This was their majestic interpretation of the economy of the universe. This was their lofty, and wise, and noble

understanding of the justice of the Creator to His creatures. Yes, gentlemen, to all His creatures, to the whole great family of man. In their enlightened belief, nothing stamped with the Divine image and likeness was sent into the world to be trodden on, and degraded, and imbruted by its fellows. They grasped not only the race of men then living, but they reached forward and seized upon the furthest posterity. They created a beacon to guide their children and their children's children, and the countless myriads who should inhabit the earth in other ages. Wise statesmen as they were, they knew the tendency of prosperity to breed tyrants, and so they established these great self-evident truths that when in the distant future, some man, some faction, some interest, should set up the doctrine that none but rich men, or none but white men, or none but Anglo-Saxon white men, were entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, their posterity might look up again to the Declaration of Independence, and take courage to renew the battle which their fathers began, so that truth, and justice, and mercy, and all the humane and Christian virtues, might not be extinguished from the land; so that no man would hereafter dare to limit and circumscribe the great principles on which the temple of liberty was being built.

Now, my countrymen, if you have been taught doctrines conflicting with the great landmarks of the Declaration of Independence; if you have listened to suggestions which would take away from its grandeur, and mutilate the fair symmetry of its proportions; if you have been inclined to believe that all men are not created equal in those inalienable rights enumerated by our chart of liberty, let me entreat you to come back—return to the fountain, whose waters spring close by the blood of the Revolution. Think nothing of me, take no thought for the political fate of any man whomsoever, but come back to the truths that are in the Declaration of Independence.

You may do anything with me you choose, if you will but heed these sacred principles. You may not only

defeat me for the Senate, but you may take me and put me to death. While pretending no indifference to earthly honors, I *do claim* to be actuated in this contest by something higher than an anxiety for office. I charge you to drop every paltry and insignificant thought for any man's success. It is nothing; I am nothing; Judge Douglas is nothing. *But do not destroy that immortal emblem of humanity—the Declaration of American Independence.*

But we have not space for further extracts from those memorable speeches. They produced a remarkable effect upon their hearers, and procured their author an extended fame as one of the readiest and most popular of popular orators. They have been widely disseminated by the Republican party since. The struggle was fierce, but it has been said that

“In perhaps the severest test that could have been applied to any man's temper—his political contest with Senator Douglas in 1858—Mr. Lincoln not only proved himself an able speaker and a good tactician, but demonstrated that it is possible to carry on the fiercest political warfare without once descending to rude personality and coarse denunciation. We have it on the authority of a gentleman who followed Abram Lincoln throughout the whole of that campaign, that in spite of all the temptations to an opposite course to which he was continuously exposed, no personalities against his opponent, no vituperation or coarseness, ever defiled his lips. His kind and genial nature lifted him above a resort to any such weapons of political warfare, and it was the commonly expressed regret of fiercer natures that he treated his opponent too courteously and urbanely. Vulgar personalities and vituperation are the last thing that can be truthfully charged against Abram Lincoln. His heart is too genial, his good sense too strong, and his innate self-respect too predominant, to permit him to indulge in them. His nobility of nature—and we use the term

advisedly—has been as manifest through his whole career, as his temperate habits, his self-reliance, and his mental and intellectual power.”

The result of the campaign was a Republican majority on the popular vote.

	FREMONT.	FILLMORE.	BUCHANAN.
Total vote in '56	96,189	37,444	105,348
	LINCOLN.	LECOMPTON.	DOUGLAS.
Total vote in '58	125,275	5,071	121,130
L's gain on '56.	29,086.	Douglas's do. . . .	15,742
Lincoln's net gain, 14,344.			

But owing to the apportionment of the Legislature, Douglas's majority in joint ballot was eight; three in the Senate, and five in the House; so that he enjoyed the fruits of a victory, while Lincoln had the honors, which, in this instance, were barren indeed.

Since the close of the campaign of 1858, Lincoln has been the favorite candidate of Illinois for the Presidency. Republicans too, in other states, attracted by the fame he obtained in this contest, have summoned him to aid them; and at Columbus, and Cincinnati, Ohio, he made in the fall of 1859, two powerful and effective speeches, which extended his reputation. On the 27th of February, 1860, he delivered at the Cooper Institute, New York, another speech, which the Republicans received at the time with great enthusiasm, and afterwards accepted as a sort of shibboleth of their party. It has since been repeated several times in the New England States.

SPEECH OF ABRAM LINCOLN, DELIVERED AT THE COOPER
INSTITUTE, MONDAY, *Feb.* 27, 1860.

MR. PRESIDENT AND FELLOW-CITIZENS OF NEW YORK :
The facts with which I shall deal this evening are mainly old and familiar ; nor is there anything new in the general use I shall make of them. If there shall be any novelty, it will be in the mode of presenting the facts, and the inferences and observations following that presentation.

In his speech last autumn, at Columbus, Ohio, as reported in *The New York Times*, Senator Douglas said :

“ Our fathers, when they framed the Government under which we live, understood this question just as well, and even better than we do now.”

I fully indorse this, and I adopt it as a text for this discourse. I so adopt it because it furnishes a precise and an agreed starting point for the discussion between Republicans and that wing of Democracy headed by Senator Douglas. It simply leaves the inquiry : “ What was the understanding those fathers had of the question mentioned ? ”

What is the frame of Government under which we live ?

The answer must be : “ The Constitution of the United States.” That Constitution consists of the original, framed in 1787 (and under which the present Government first went into operation), and twelve subsequently framed amendments, the first ten of which were framed in 1789.

Who were our fathers that framed the Constitution ? I suppose the “ thirty-nine ” who signed the original instrument may be fairly called our fathers who framed that part of the present Government. It is almost exactly true to say they framed it, and it is altogether true to say they fairly represented the opinion and sentiment of the whole nation at that time. Their names

being familiar to nearly all, and accessible to quite all, need not now be repeated.

I take these "thirty-nine," for the present, as being "our fathers who framed the Government under which we live."

What is the question which, according to the text, those fathers understood just as well, and even better than we do now?

It is this: Does the proper division of local from federal authority, or anything in the Constitution, forbid our Federal Government to control as to slavery in our Federal Territories?

Upon this, Douglas holds the affirmative, and Republicans the negative. This affirmative and denial form an issue; and this issue—this question—is precisely what the text declares our fathers understood better than we.

Let us now inquire whether the "thirty-nine," or any of them, ever acted upon this question; and if they did, how they acted upon it—how they expressed that better understanding.

In 1784—three years before the Constitution—the United States then owning the Northwestern Territory, and no other—the Congress of the Confederation had before them the question of prohibiting slavery in that Territory; and four of the "thirty-nine" who afterward framed the Constitution were in that Congress, and voted on that question. Of these, Roger Sherman, Thomas Mifflin, and Hugh Williamson voted for the prohibition—thus showing that, in their understanding, no line divided local from federal authority, nor anything else, properly forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in federal territory. The other of the four—James McHenry—voted against the prohibition, showing that, for some cause, he thought it improper to vote for it.

In 1787, still before the Constitution, but while the Convention was in session framing it, and while the Northwestern Territory still was the only territory owned by the United States—the same question of pro-

hibiting slavery in the territory again came before the Congress of the Confederation; and three more of the "thirty-nine" who afterward signed the Constitution, were in that Congress, and voted on the question. They were William Blount, William Few, and Abraham Baldwin; and they all voted for the prohibition—thus showing that, in their understanding, no line dividing local from federal authority, nor anything else, properly forbids the Federal Government to control as to slavery in federal territory. This time the prohibition became a law, being part of what is now well known as the Ordinance of '87.

The question of federal control of slavery in the territories, seems not to have been directly before the Convention which framed the original Constitution; and hence it is not recorded that the "thirty-nine" or any of them, while engaged on that instrument, expressed any opinion on that precise question.

In 1789, by the first Congress which sat under the Constitution, an act was passed to enforce the Ordinance of '87 including the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern Territory. The bill for this act was reported by one of the "thirty-nine," Thomas Fitzsimmons, then a member of the House of Representatives from Pennsylvania. It went through all its stages without a word of opposition, and finally passed both branches without yeas and nays, which is equivalent to an unanimous passage. In this Congress there were sixteen of the "thirty-nine" fathers who framed the original Constitution. They were John Langdon, Nicholas Gilman, Wm. S. Johnson, Roger Sherman, Robert Morris, Thos. Fitzsimmons, William Few, Abraham Baldwin, Rufus King, William Patterson, George Clymer, Richard Bassett, George Read, Pierce Butler, Daniel Carroll, James Madison.

This shows that, in their understanding, no line dividing local from federal authority, nor anything in the Constitution, properly forbade Congress to prohibit slavery in the federal territory; else both their fidelity to correct principle, and their oath to support the Con-

stitution, would have constrained them to oppose the prohibition.

Again, George Washington, another of the "thirty-nine," was then President of the United States, and, as such, approved and signed the bill, thus completing its validity as a law, and thus showing that, in his understanding, no line dividing local from federal authority, nor anything in the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in federal territory.

No great while after the adoption of the original Constitution, North Carolina ceded to the Federal Government the country now constituting the State of Tennessee; and a few years later, Georgia ceded that which now constitutes the States of Mississippi and Alabama. In both deeds of cession it was made a condition by the ceding States that the Federal Government should not prohibit slavery in the ceded country. Besides this, slavery was then actually in the ceded country. Under these circumstances, Congress, on taking charge of these countries did not absolutely prohibit slavery within them. But they did interfere with it—take control of it—even there, to a certain extent. In 1798 Congress organized the Territory of Mississippi. In the act of organization they prohibited the bringing of slaves into the Territory, from any place without the United States, by fine, and giving freedom to slaves so bought. This act passed both branches of Congress without yeas and nays. In that Congress were three of the "thirty-nine" who framed the original Constitution. They were John Langdon, George Read, and Abraham Baldwin. They all, probably, voted for it. Certainly they would have placed their opposition to it upon record, if, in their understanding, any line dividing local from federal authority, or anything in the Constitution, properly forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in federal territory.

In 1803, the Federal Government purchased the Louisiana country. Our former territorial acquisitions came from certain of our own States; but this Louisiana

country was acquired from a foreign nation. In 1804, Congress gave a territorial organization to that part of it which now constitutes the State of Louisiana. New Orleans, lying within that part, was an old and comparatively large city. There were other considerable towns and settlements, and slavery was extensively and thoroughly intermingled with the people. Congress did not, in the Territorial Act, prohibited Slavery; but they did interfere with it—take control of it—in a more marked and extensive way than they did in the case of Mississippi. The substance of the provision therein made, in relation to slaves, was:

First. That no slave should be imported into the territory from foreign parts.

Second. That no slave should be carried into it who had been imported into the United States since the first day of May, 1793.

Third. That no slave should be carried into it, except by the owner, and for his own use as a settler; the penalty in all the cases being a fine upon the violator of the law, and freedom to the slave.

This act also was passed without yeas and nays. In the Congress which passed it, there were two of the "thirty-nine." They were Abraham Baldwin and Jonathan Dayton. As stated in the case of Mississippi, it is probable they both voted for it. They would not have allowed it to pass without recording their opposition to it, if, in their understanding, it violated either the line proper dividing local from federal authority or any provision of the Constitution.

In 1819-20, came and passed the Missouri question. Many votes were taken, by yeas and nays, in both branches of Congress, upon the various phases of the general question. Two of the "thirty-nine"—Rufus King and Charles Pinckney—were members of that Congress. Mr. King steadily voted for slavery prohibition and against all compromises, while Mr. Pinckney as steadily voted against slavery prohibition and against all compromises. By this Mr. King showed that, in his understanding, no line dividing local from federal

authority, nor anything in the Constitution, was violated by Congress prohibiting slavery in federal territory; while Mr. Pinckney, by his votes, showed that in his understanding there was some sufficient reason for opposing such prohibition in that case.

The cases I have mentioned are the only acts of the "thirty-nine," or of any of them, upon the direct issue, which I have been able to discover.

To enumerate the persons who thus acted, as being four in 1784, three in 1787, seventeen in 1789, three in 1798, two in 1804, and two in 1819-20—there would be thirty-one of them. But this would be counting John Langdon, Roger Sherman, William Few, Rufus King, and George Read, each twice, and Abraham Baldwin four times. The true number of those of the "thirty-nine" whom I have shown to have acted upon the question, which, by the text they understood better than we, is twenty-three, leaving sixteen not shown to have acted upon it in any way.

Here, then, we have twenty-three out of our "thirty-nine" fathers who framed the Government under which we live, who have, upon their official responsibility and their corporal oaths, acted upon the very question which the text affirms they "understood just as well, and even better than we do now;" and twenty-one of them—a clear majority of the "thirty-nine"—so acting upon it as to make them guilty of gross political impropriety, and wilful perjury, if, in their understanding, any proper division between local and federal authority, or anything in the Constitution they had made themselves, and sworn to support, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the federal territories. Thus the twenty-one acted; and, as actions speak louder than words, so actions under such responsibility speak still louder.

Two of the twenty-three voted against Congressional prohibition of slavery in the federal territories, in the instances in which they acted upon the question. But for what reasons they so voted is not known. They may have done so because they thought a proper divi-

sion of local from federal authority, or some provision or principle of the Constitution, stood in the way; or they may, without any such question, have voted against the prohibition, on what appeared to them to be sufficient grounds of expediency. No one who has sworn to support the Constitution, can conscientiously vote for what he understands to be an unconstitutional measure, however expedient he may think it; but one may and ought to vote against a measure which he deems constitutional, if, at the same time, he deems it inexpedient. It, therefore, would be unsafe to set down even the two who voted against the prohibition, as having done so because, in their understanding, any proper division of local from federal authority, or anything in the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in federal territory.

The remaining sixteen of the "thirty-nine," so far as I have discovered, have left no record of their understanding upon the direct question of federal control of slavery in the federal territories. But there is much reason to believe that their understanding upon that question would not have appeared different from that of their twenty-three compeers, had it been manifested at all.

For the purpose of adhering rigidly to the text, I have purposely omitted whatever understanding may have been manifested, by any person, however distinguished, other than the thirty-nine fathers who framed the original Constitution; and, for the same reason, I have also omitted whatever understanding may have been manifested by any of the "thirty-nine" even, on any other phase of the general question of slavery. If we should look into their acts and declarations on those other phases, as the foreign slave-trade, and the morality and policy of slavery generally, it would appear to us that on the direct question of federal control of slavery in federal territories, the sixteen, if they had acted at all, would probably have acted just as the twenty-three did. Among that sixteen were several of the most noted anti-slavery men of those times—as Dr. Franklin, Alexander

Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris—while there was not one now known to have been otherwise, unless it may be John Rutledge, of South Carolina.

The sum of the whole is, that of our “thirty-nine” fathers who framed the original Constitution, twenty-one—a clear majority of the whole—certainly understood that no proper division of local from federal authority nor any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control slavery in the federal territories, while all the rest probably had the same understanding. Such, unquestionably, was the understanding of our fathers who framed the original Constitution; and the text affirms that they understood the question better than we.

But, so far, I have been considering the understanding of the question manifested by the framers of the original Constitution. In and by the original instrument, a mode was provided for amending it; and, as I have already stated, the present frame of Government under which we live consists of that original, and twelve amendatory articles framed and adopted since. Those who now insist that federal control of slavery in federal territories violates the Constitution, point us to the provisions which they suppose it thus violates; and, as I understand, they all fix upon provisions in these amendatory articles, and not in the original instrument. The Supreme Court, in the Dred Scott case, plant themselves upon the fifth amendment, which provides that “no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law;” while Senator Douglas and his peculiar adherents plant themselves upon the tenth amendment, providing that “the powers not granted by the Constitution, are reserved to the States respectively, and to the people.”

Now, it so happens that these amendments were framed by the first Congress which sat under the Constitution—the identical Congress which passed the act already mentioned, enforcing the prohibition of slavery in the northwestern territory. Not only was it the same Congress, but they were the identical, same individual

men who, at the same session, and at the same time within the session, had under consideration, and in progress toward maturity, these Constitutional amendments, and this act prohibiting slavery in all the territory the nation then owned. The Constitutional amendments were introduced before, and passed after the act enforcing the Ordinance of '87; so that during the whole pendency of the act to enforce the Ordinance, the Constitutional amendments were also pending.

That Congress, consisting in all of seventy-six members, including sixteen of the framers of the original Constitution, as before stated, were pre-eminently our fathers who framed that part of the Government under which we live, which is now claimed as forbidding the Federal Government to control slavery in the federal territories.

Is it not a little presumptuous in any one at this day to affirm that the two things which that Congress deliberately framed, and carried to maturity at the same time, are absolutely inconsistent with each other? And does not such affirmation become impudently absurd when coupled with the other affirmation, from the same mouth, that those who did the two things alleged to be inconsistent understood whether they really were inconsistent better than we—better than he who affirms that they are inconsistent?

It is surely safe to assume that the "thirty-nine" framers of the original Constitution, and the seventy-six members of the Congress which framed the amendments thereto, taken together, do certainly include those who may be fairly called "our fathers who framed the Government under which we live." And so assuming, I defy any man to show that any one of them ever, in his whole life, declared that, in his understanding, any proper division of local from federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the federal territories. I go a step further. I defy any one to show that any living man in the whole world ever did, prior to the beginning of the present century (and I might almost say prior to the

beginning of the last half of the present century), declare that, in his understanding, any proper division of local from federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the federal territories. To those who now so declare, I give, not only "our fathers who framed the Government under which we live," but with them all other living men within the century in which it was framed, among whom to search, and they shall not be able to find the evidence of a single man agreeing with them.

Now, and here, let me guard a little against being misunderstood. I do not mean to say we are bound to follow implicitly in whatever our fathers did. To do so, would be to discard all the lights of current experience—to reject all progress—all improvement. What I do say is, that if we would supplant the opinions and policy of our fathers in any case, we should do so upon evidence so conclusive, and argument so clear, that even their great authority, fairly considered and weighed, cannot stand; and most surely not in a case whereof we ourselves declare they understood the question better than we.

If any man, at this day, sincerely believes that a proper division of local from federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbids the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the federal territories, he is right to say so, and to enforce his position by all truthful evidence and fair argument which he can. But he has no right to mislead others, who have less access to history and less leisure to study it, into the false belief that "our fathers, who framed the Government under which we live," were of the same opinion—thus substituting falsehood and deception for truthful evidence and fair argument. If any man at this day sincerely believes "our fathers, who framed the Government under which we live," used and applied principles, in other cases, which ought to have led them to understand that a proper division of local from federal authority or some part of the Constitution, forbids the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the federal territories, he is right

to say so. But he should, at the same time, brave the responsibility of declaring that, in his opinion, he understands their principles better than they did themselves; and especially should he not shirk that responsibility by asserting that they "understood the question just as well, and even better than we do now."

But enough. Let all who believe that "our fathers, who framed the Government under which we live, understood this question just as well, and even better than we do now," speak as they spoke, and act as they acted upon it. This is all Republicans ask—all Republicans desire—in relation to slavery. As those fathers marked it, so let it be again marked, as an evil not to be extended, but to be tolerated and protected only because of and so far as its actual presence among us makes that toleration and protection a necessity. Let all the guaranties those fathers gave it, be, not grudgingly, but fully and fairly maintained. For this Republicans contend, and with this, so far as I know or believe, they will be content.

And now, if they would listen—as I suppose they will not—I would address a few words to the southern people.

I would say to them: You consider yourselves a reasonable and a just people; and I consider that in the general qualities of reason and justice you are not inferior to any other people. Still, when you speak of us Republicans, you do so only to denounce us as reptiles, or, at the best, as no better than outlaws. You will grant a hearing to pirates or murderers, but nothing like it to "Black Republicans." In all your contentions with one another, each of you deems an unconditional condemnation of "Black Republicanism" as the first thing to be attended to. Indeed, such condemnation of us seems to be an indispensable prerequisite—license, so to speak—among you to be admitted or permitted to speak at all.

Now, can you, or not, be prevailed upon to pause and to consider whether this is quite just to us, or even to yourselves?

Bring forward your charges and specifications, and then be patient long enough to hear us deny or justify.

You say we are sectional. We deny it. That makes an issue; and the burden of proof is upon you. You produce your proof; and what is it? Why, that our party has no existence in your section—gets no votes in your section. The fact is substantially true; but does it prove the issue? If it does, then in case we should, without change of principle, begin to get votes in your section, we should thereby cease to be sectional. You cannot escape this conclusion; and yet, are you willing to abide by it? If you are, you will probably soon find that we have ceased to be sectional, for we shall get votes in your section this very year. You will then begin to discover, as the truth plainly is, that your proof does not touch the issue. The fact that we get no votes in your section is a fact of your making, and not of ours. And if there be fault in that fact, that fault is primarily yours, and remains so until you show that we repel you by some wrong principle or practice. If we do repel you by any wrong principle or practice, the fault is ours; but this brings us to where you ought to have started—to a discussion of the right or wrong of our principle. If our principle, put in practice, would wrong your section for the benefit of ours, or for any other object, then our principle, and we with it, are sectional, and are justly opposed and denounced as such. Meet us, then, on the question of whether our principle, put in practice, would wrong your section; and so meet it as if it were possible that something may be said on our side. Do you accept the challenge? No? Then you really believe that the principle which our fathers who framed the Government under which we live thought so clearly right as to adopt it, and indorse it again and again upon their official oaths, is, in fact, so clearly wrong as to demand your condemnation without a moment's consideration.

Some of you delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against sectional parties given by Washington in his Farewell Address. Less than eight years before Washington gave that warning, he had, as President of the United States, approved and signed an act of Congress, enforcing the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern

Territory, which act embodied the policy of the Government upon that subject, up to and at the very moment he penned that warning; and about one year after he penned it he wrote Lafayette that he considered that prohibition a wise measure, expressing in the same connection his hope that we should some time have a confederacy of free States.

Bearing this in mind, and seeing that sectionalism has since arisen upon this same subject, is that warning a weapon in your hands against us, or in our hands against you? Could Washington himself speak, would he cast the blame of that sectionalism upon us, who sustain his policy, or upon you who repudiate it? We respect that warning of Washington, and we commend it to you, together with his example pointing to the right application of it.

But you say you are conservative—eminently conservative—while we are revolutionary, destructive, or something of the sort. What is conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried, against the new and untried? We stick to, contend for, the identical old policy on the point in controversy which was adopted by our fathers who framed the Government under which we live; while you with one accord reject, and scout, and spit upon that old policy, and insist upon substituting something new. True, you disagree among yourselves as to what that substitute shall be. You have considerable variety of new propositions and plans, but you are unanimous in rejecting and denouncing the old policy of the fathers. Some of you are for reviving the foreign slave-trade; some for a Congressional Slave-Code for the Territories; some for Congress forbidding the Territories to prohibit Slavery within their limits; some for maintaining Slavery in the Territories through the Judiciary; some for the “gur-reat pur-rinciple” that “if one man would enslave another, no third man should object,” fantastically called “Popular Sovereignty;” but never a man among you in favor of federal prohibition of slavery in federal territories, according to the practise of our fathers who framed the Government under which we

live. Not one of all your various plans can show a precedent or an advocate in the century within which our Government originated. Consider, then, whether your claim of conservatism for yourselves, and your charge of destructiveness against us, are based on the most clear and stable foundations.

Again, you say we have made the slavery question more prominent than it formerly was. We deny it. We admit that it is more prominent, but we deny that we made it so. It was not we, but you, who discarded the old policy of the fathers. We resisted, and still resist, your innovation; and thence comes the greater prominence of the question. Would you have that question reduced to its former proportions? Go back to that old policy. What has been will be again, under the same conditions. If you would have the peace of the old times, re-adopt the precepts and policy of the old times.

You charge that we stir up insurrections among your slaves. We deny it; and what is your proof? Harper's Ferry! John Brown! John Brown was no Republican; and you have failed to implicate a single Republican in his Harper's Ferry enterprise. If any member of our party is guilty in that matter, you know it or you do not know it. If you do know it, you are inexcusable to not designate the man, and prove the fact. If you do not know it, you are inexcusable to assert it, and especially to persist in the assertion after you have tried and failed to make the proof. You need not be told that persisting in a charge which one does not know to be true, is simply malicious slander.

Some of you admit that no Republican designedly aided or encouraged the Harper's Ferry affair; but still insist that our doctrines and declarations necessarily lead to such results. We do not believe it. We know we hold to no doctrine, and make no declarations, which were not held to and made by our fathers who framed the Government under which we live. You never dealt fairly by us in relation to this affair. When it occurred, some important State elections were near at hand, and

you were in evident glee with the belief that, by charging the blame upon us, you could get an advantage of us in those elections. The elections came, and your expectations were not quite fulfilled. Every Republican man knew that, as to himself at least, your charge was a slander, and he was not much inclined by it to cast his vote in your favor. Republican doctrines and declarations are accompanied with a continual protest against any interference whatever with your slaves, or with you about your slaves. Surely, this does not encourage them to revolt. True, we do, in common with our fathers, who framed the Government under which we live, declare our belief that slavery is wrong; but the slaves do not hear us declare even this. For anything we say or do, the slaves would scarcely know there is a Republican party. I believe they would not, in fact, generally know it but for your misrepresentations of us, in their hearing. In your political contests among yourselves, each faction charges the other with sympathy with Black Republicanism; and then, to give point to the charge, defines Black Republicanism to simply be insurrection, blood and thunder among the slaves.

Slave insurrections are no more common now than they were before the Republican party was organized. What induced the Southampton insurrection, twenty-eight years ago, in which, at least, three times as many lives were lost as at Harper's Ferry? You can scarcely stretch your very elastic fancy to the conclusion that Southampton was got up by Black Republicanism. In the present state of things in the United States, I do not think a general, or even a very extensive slave insurrection, is possible. The indispensable concert of action cannot be attained. The slaves have no means of rapid communication; nor can incendiary free men, black or white, supply it. The explosive materials are every where in parcels; but there neither are, nor can be supplied, the indispensable connecting trains.

Much is said by southern people about the affection of slaves for their masters and mistresses; and a part of it, at least, is true. A plot for an uprising could scarcely

be devised and communicated to twenty individuals before some one of them, to save the life of a favorite master or mistress, would divulge it. This is the rule; and the slave-revolution in Hayti was not an exception to it, but a case occurring under peculiar circumstances. The gunpowder-plot of British history, though not connected with slaves, was more in point. In that case, only about twenty were admitted to the secret; and yet one of them, in his anxiety to save a friend, betrayed the plot to that friend, and, by consequence, averted the calamity. Occasional poisonings from the kitchen, and open or stealthy assassinations in the field, and local revolts extending to a score or so, will continue to occur as the natural results of slavery; but no general insurrection of slaves, as I think, can happen in this country for a long time. Whoever much fears, or much hopes, for such an event, will be alike disappointed.

In the language of Mr. Jefferson, uttered many years ago, "It is still in our power to direct the process of emancipation, and deportation, peaceably, and in such slow degrees, as that the evil will wear off insensibly; and their place be, *pari passu*, filled up by free white laborers. If, on the contrary, it is left to force itself on, human nature must shudder at the prospect held up."

Mr. Jefferson did not mean to say, nor do I, that the power of emancipation is in the Federal Government. He spoke of Virginia; and, as to the power of emancipation, I speak of the slaveholding States only.

The Federal Government, however, as we insist, has the power of restraining the extension of the institution—the power to insure that a slave insurrection shall never occur on any American soil which is now free from slavery.

John Brown's effort was peculiar. It was not a slave insurrection. It was an attempt by white men to get up a revolt among slaves, in which the slaves refused to participate. In fact, it was so absurd that the slaves, with all their ignorance, saw plainly enough it could not succeed. That affair, in its philosophy, corresponds

with the many attempts, related in history, at the assassination of kings and emperors. An enthusiast broods over the oppression of a people till he fancies himself commissioned by Heaven to liberate them. He ventures the attempt, which ends in little else than in his own execution. Orsini's attempt on Louis Napoleon, and John Brown's attempt at Harper's Ferry were, in their philosophy, precisely the same. The eagerness to cast blame on old England in the one case, and on New England in the other, does not disprove the sameness of the two things.

And how much would it avail you, if you could, by the use of John Brown, Helper's book, and the like, break up the Republican organization? Human action can be modified to some extent, but human nature cannot be changed. There is a judgment and a feeling against slavery in this nation, which cast at least a million and a half of votes. You cannot destroy that judgment and feeling—that sentiment—by breaking up the political organization which rallies around it. You can scarcely scatter and disperse an army which has been formed into order in the face of your heaviest fire; but if you could, how much would you gain by forcing the sentiment which created it out of the peaceful channel of the ballot box, into some other channel. What would that other channel probably be? Would the number of John Browns be lessened or enlarged by the operation.

But you will break up the Union rather than submit to a denial of your Constitutional rights.

That has a somewhat reckless sound; but it would be palliated, if not fully justified, were we proposing, by the mere force of numbers, to deprive you of some right, plainly written down in the Constitution. But we are proposing no such thing.

When you make these declarations, you have a specific and well-understood allusion to an assumed Constitutional right of yours, to take slaves into the federal territories, and hold them there as property. But no such right is specifically written in the Constitution. That

instrument is literally silent about any such right. We, on the contrary, deny that such a right has any existence in the Constitution, even by implication.

Your purpose, then, plainly stated, is, that you will destroy the Government, unless you be allowed to construe and enforce the Constitution as you please, on all points in dispute between you and us. You will rule or ruin in all events.

This, plainly stated, is your language to us. Perhaps you will say the Supreme Court has decided the disputed Constitutional question in your favor. Not quite so. But waiving the lawyer's distinction between dictum and decision, the Courts have decided the question for you in a sort of way. The Courts have substantially said, it is your Constitutional right to take slaves into the federal territories, and to hold them there as property.

When I say the decision was made in a sort of way, I mean it was made in a divided Court by a bare majority of the Judges, and they not quite agreeing with one another in the reasons for making it; that it is so made as that its avowed supporters disagree with one another about its meaning, and that it was mainly based upon a mistaken statement of fact—the statement in the opinion that “the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.”

An inspection of the Constitution will show that the right of property in a slave is not distinctly and expressly affirmed in it. Bear in mind the Judges do not pledge their judicial opinion that such right is impliedly affirmed in the Constitution; but they pledge their veracity that it is distinctly and expressly affirmed there—“distinctly” that is, not mingled with anything else—“expressly” that is, in words meaning just that, without the aid of any inference, and susceptible of no other meaning.

If they had only pledged their judicial opinion that such right is affirmed in the instrument by implication, it would be open to others to show that neither the word “slave” nor “slavery” is to be found in the Constitution, nor the word “property” even, in any connection with language alluding to the things slave, or slavery, and that

wherever in that instrument the slave is alluded to, he is called a "person;" and wherever his master's legal right in relation to him is alluded to, it is spoken of as "service or labor due," as a "debt" payable in service or labor. Also, it would be open to show, by contemporaneous history, that this mode of alluding to slaves and slavery, instead of speaking of them, was employed on purpose to exclude from the Constitution the idea that there could be property in man.

To show all this is easy and certain.

When this obvious mistake of the Judges shall be brought to their notice, it is not reasonable to expect that they will withdraw the mistaken statement, and reconsider the conclusion based upon it?

And then it is to be remembered that "our fathers, who framed the Government under which we live"—the men who made the Constitution—decided this same Constitutional question in our favor, long ago—decided it without a division among themselves, when making the decision; without division among themselves about the meaning of it after it was made, and so far as any evidence is left, without basing it upon any mistaken statement of facts.

Under all these circumstances, do you really feel yourselves justified to break up this Government, unless such a court decision as yours is shall be at once submitted to as a conclusive and final rule of political action?

But you will not abide the election of a Republican President. In that supposed event, you say, you will destroy the Union; and then, you say, the great crime of having destroyed it will be upon us!

That is cool. A highwayman holds a pistol to my ear, and mutters through his teeth, "stand and deliver, or I shall kill you, and then you will be a murderer!"

To be sure, what the robber demanded of me—my money—was my own; and I had a clear right to keep it; but it was no more my own than my vote is my own; and threat of death to me, to extort my money, and the threat of destruction to the Union, to extort my vote, can scarcely be distinguished in principle.

A few words now to Republicans. It is exceedingly desirable that all parts of this great Confederacy shall be at peace, and in harmony, one with another. Let us Republicans do our part to have it so. Even though much provoked, let us do nothing through passion and ill temper. Even though the southern people will not so much as listen to us, let us calmly consider their demands, and yield to them if, in our deliberate view of our duty, we possibly can. Judging by all they say and do, and by the subject and nature of their controversy with us, let us determine, if we can, what will satisfy them?

Will they be satisfied if the Territories be unconditionally surrendered to them? We know they will not. In all their present complaints against us, the Territories are scarcely mentioned. Invasions and insurrections are the rage now. Will it satisfy them if, in the future, we have nothing to do with invasions and insurrections? We know it will not. We so know because we know we never had anything to do with invasions and insurrections; and yet this total abstaining does not exempt us from the charge and the denunciation.

The question recurs, what will satisfy them? Simply this: We must not only let them alone, but we must, somehow, convince them that we do let them alone. This, we know by experience, is no easy task. We have been so trying to convince them, from the very beginning of our organization, but with no success. In all our platforms and speeches we have constantly protested our purpose to let them alone; but this has had no tendency to convince them. Alike unavailing to convince them is the fact that they have never detected a man of us in any attempt to disturb them.

These natural, and apparently adequate means all failing, what will convince them? This, and this only: cease to call slavery *wrong*, and join them in calling it *right*. And this must be done thoroughly—done in *acts* as well as in *words*. Silence will not be tolerated—we must place ourselves avowedly with them. Douglas's new sedition law must be enacted and enforced, suppressing all declarations that slavery is wrong, whether made

in politics, in presses, in pulpits, or in private. We must arrest and return their fugitive slaves with greedy pleasure. We must pull down our Free-State Constitutions. The whole atmosphere must be disinfected from all taint of opposition to slavery, before they will cease to believe that all their troubles proceed from us.

I am quite aware they do not state their case precisely in this way. Most of them would probably say to us, "Let us alone, do nothing to us, and say what you please about slavery." But we do let them alone—have never disturbed them—so that, after all, it is what we say, which dissatisfies them. They will continue to accuse us of doing, until we cease saying.

I am also aware they have not, as yet, in terms demanded the overthrow of our Free-State Constitutions. Yet those Constitutions declare the wrong of slavery, with more solemn emphasis, than do all other sayings against it; and when all these other sayings shall have been silenced, the overthrow of these Constitutions will be demanded, and nothing be left to resist the demand. It is nothing to the contrary, that they do not demand the whole of this just now. Demanding what they do, and for the reason they do, they can voluntarily stop nowhere short of this consummation. Holding, as they do, that slavery is morally right, and socially elevating, they cannot cease to demand a full national recognition of it, as a legal right, and a social blessing.

Nor can we justifiably withhold this, on any ground save our conviction that slavery is wrong. If slavery is right, all words, acts, laws, and constitutions against it, are themselves wrong, and should be silenced, and swept away. If it is right, we cannot justly object to its nationality—its universality; if it is wrong, they cannot justly insist upon its extension—its enlargement. All they ask, we could readily grant, if we thought slavery right; all we ask, they could as readily grant, if they thought it wrong. Their thinking it right, and our thinking it wrong, is the precise fact upon which depends the whole controversy. Thinking it right, as they do, they are not to blame for desiring its full recognition, as being right;

but, thinking it wrong, as we do, can we yield to them? Can we cast our votes with their view, and against our own? In view of our moral, social, and political responsibilities, can we do this?

Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where it is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from its actual presence in the nation; but can we, while our votes will prevent it, allow it to spread into the National Territories, and to overrun us here in these Free States?

If our sense of duty forbids this, then let us stand by our duty, fearlessly and effectively. Let us be diverted by none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so industriously plied and belabored—contrivances such as groping for some middle ground between the right and the wrong, vain as the search for a man who should be neither a living man nor a dead man—such as a policy of “don’t care” on a question about which all true men do care—such as Union appeals beseeching true Union men to yield to Disunionists, reversing the divine rule, and calling, not the sinners, but the righteous to repentance—such as invocations to Washington, imploring men to unsay what Washington said, and undo what Washington did.

Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction to the Government, nor of dungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty, as we understand it.

THE NOMINATION.

The Republican Nominating Convention met at Chicago on the 16th of May, and spent one day in organizing, another in adopting a platform, and on the third proceeded to ballot for a candidate. On the third ballot Abram Lincoln was nominated, and immediately afterwards declared to be the unanimous choice of the Convention. The scene of enthusiasm which was then enacted both within and without the building is described by eye witnesses to have been extremely exciting. The fact that a citizen of Illinois had been nominated by so great and powerful a party for the office of President of the United States, very naturally awoke all the enthusiasm of his political allies in Chicago, and the members of the Convention themselves shared in the delight that their important labors had been so speedily and so peacefully consummated. Hannibal Hamlin was, on the second ballot, nominated for the Vice-Presidency.

The Committee appointed by the Chicago Convention, comprising President Ashmun and the Chairmen of the State delegations, to officially announce to Mr. Lincoln his nomination, arrived at Springfield on Saturday night, and proceeded to Mr. Lincoln's residence,

where Mr. Ashmun in a brief speech presented Mr. Lincoln the letter announcing his nomination.

Mr. Lincoln replied, as follows :—

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Committee—I tender you, and through you to the Republican National Convention and all the people represented in it, my profoundest thanks for the high honor done me, which you formally announce. Deeply and even painfully sensible of the great responsibility which is inseparable from that honor, a responsibility which I could almost wish could have fallen upon some one of the far more eminent men and experienced statesmen, whose distinguished names were before the Convention, I shall, by your leave, consider more fully the resolutions of the Convention denominated the platform, and without unreasonable delay respond to you, Mr. Chairman, in writing, not doubting that the platform will be found satisfactory, and the nomination accepted; and now I will no longer defer the pleasure of taking you and each of you by the hand.

THE PLATFORM.

The platform on which the adherents of Lincoln and Hamlin are to fight during the present campaign is as follows :—

Resolved, That we, the delegated representatives of the Republican electors of the United States, in Convention assembled, in the discharge of the duty we owe

to our constituents and our country, unite in the following declarations:—

1st. That the history of the nation during the last four years has fully established the propriety and necessity of the organization and perpetuation of the Republican party, and that the causes which called it into existence are permanent in their nature, and now more than ever before demand its peaceful and constitutional triumph.

2d. That the maintenance of the principles promulgated in the Declaration of Independence, and embodied in the Federal Constitution, is essential to the preservation of our Republican institutions, and that the Federal Constitution, the rights of the States, and the Union of the States, must and shall be preserved.

3d. That to the Union of the States this nation owes its unprecedented increase in population; its surprising development of material resources; its rapid augmentation of wealth; its happiness at home and its honor abroad; and we hold in abhorrence all schemes for disunion, come from whatever source they may; and we congratulate the country that no Republican member of Congress has uttered or countenanced a threat of disunion, so often made by Democratic members of Congress without rebuke, and with applause from their political associates; and we denounce those threats of disunion, in case of a popular overthrow of their ascendancy, as denying the vital principles of a free government, and as an avowal of contemplated treason,

which it is the imperative duty of an indignant people strongly to rebuke and for ever silence.

4th. That the maintenance, inviolate, of the rights of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions, according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political faith depends; and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of any state or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.

5th. That the present Democratic administration has far exceeded our worst apprehensions in its measureless subserviency to the exactions of a sectional interest, as is especially evident in its desperate exertions to force the infamous Lecompton constitution upon the protesting people of Kansas—in construing the personal relation between master and servant to involve an unqualified property in persons—in its attempted enforcement everywhere, on land and sea, through the intervention of Congress and the federal courts, of the extreme pretensions of a purely local interest, and in its general and unvarying abuse of the power entrusted to it by a confiding people.

6th. That the people justly view with alarm the reckless extravagance which pervades every department of the federal government; that a return to rigid economy and accountability is indispensable to arrest the system of plunder of the public treasury by favored partisans;

while the recent startling developments of fraud and corruption at the federal metropolis, show that an entire change of administration is imperatively demanded.

7th. That the new dogma that the constitution of its own force carries slavery into any or all of the Territories of the United States is a dangerous political heresy, at variance with the explicit provisions of that instrument itself, with contemporaneous exposition, and with legislative and judicial precedent; is revolutionary in its tendency, and subversive of the peace and harmony of the country.

8th That the normal condition of all the territory of the United States is that of freedom; that as our republican fathers, when they had abolished slavery in all our national territory, ordained that no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, it becomes our duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary, to maintain this provision of the constitution against all attempts to violate it; and we deny the authority of Congress, of a Territorial Legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any Territory of the United States.

9th. That we brand the recent reopening of the African slave trade, under the cover of our national flag, aided by perversions of judicial power, as a crime against humanity, a burning shame to our country and age; and we call upon Congress to take prompt and efficient measures for the total and final suppression of that execrable traffic.

10th. That in their recent vetoes by their federal governors of the acts of the Legislature of Kansas and Nebraska, prohibiting slavery in those Territories, we find a practical illustration of the boasted Democratic principles of non-intervention and popular sovereignty, embodied in the Kansas and Nebraska bill, and a denunciation of the deception and fraud involved therein.

11th. That Kansas should of right be immediately admitted as a State under the Constitution recently formed and adopted by her people, and accepted by the House of Representatives.

12th. That while providing revenue for the support of the general government by duties upon imposts, sound policy requires such an adjustment of these imposts as to encourage the development of the industrial interest of the whole country, and we commend the policy of national exchanges which secures to the working men liberal wages, to agriculture remunerating prices, to mechanics and manufacturers an adequate reward for their skill, labor and enterprise, and to the nation commercial prosperity and independence.

13th. That we protest against any sale or alienation to others of the public lands held by actual settlers, and against any view of the free Homestead policy which regards the settlers as paupers or supplicants for public bounty, and we demand the passage by Congress of the complete and satisfactory Homestead measure which has already passed the House.

14th. That the National Republican party is opposed to any change in our Naturalization laws, or any State legislation by which the rights of citizenship, hitherto accorded to immigrants from foreign lands, shall be abridged or impaired; and in favor of giving a full and efficient protection to the rights of all classes of citizens, whether native or naturalized, both at home and abroad.

15th. That appropriations by Congress for river and harbor improvements, of a national character, required for the accommodation and security of an existing commerce, are authorized by the Constitution and justified by an obligation of the Government to protect the lives and property of its citizens.

16th. That a railroad to the Pacific Ocean is imperatively demanded by the interests of the whole country; that the Federal Government ought to render immediate and efficient aid in its construction, and that as preliminary thereto, a daily overland mail should be promptly established.

17th. Finally, having thus set forth our distinctive principles and views, we invite the co-operation of all citizens, however differing on other questions, who substantially agree with us in their affirmance and support.

And so we have traced the career of the representative man, from his lowly origin and his early life as a splitter of rails and Mississippi flat-boatman, up to that proud moment when he received the formal announcement of his nomination to the position of President of the United States,

a position in some respects the proudest that a living being can occupy. Others are as powerful, but they are inherited or won by bloodshed and fraud. Alexander of Russia obtained his place by no merit of his own; Napoleon of France gained his by means that the world has agreed to pronounce disgraceful and unworthy; but the President of the American republic is chosen by the free and honest suffrages of his countrymen. If Abram Lincoln is destined to be the next successor of Washington and Adams and Jefferson and Jackson, let us trust that he will always continue to deserve his cognomen of Honest Old Abe.

HANNIBAL HAMLIN.



THE LIFE OF HANNIBAL HAMLIN.

MR. LINCOLN represents the extreme West, Mr. Hamlin the furthest of the Eastern States. The latter was born in Paris, Oxford county, Maine, August 27, 1809, the same year which gave Lincoln to the world. He is by profession a lawyer, but has been constantly in public life for the last twenty-four years. In 1836, when only twenty-seven years of age, he was elected a member of the State Legislature of Maine, and served in that capacity with so much ability as to be re-elected for four successive years. His comrades, as well as his constituents, must have appreciated him highly, for he was elected Speaker of the Legislative House of Representatives when he was twenty-eight, and retained the position during three annual sessions. From the State capitol to the National capitol was the natural advancement, and in 1843 Mr.

Hamlin was sent to Washington by the Democratic party, with whom he had always acted. He served four years in Congress with ability and fidelity to his constituents; and at the expiration of his second term, returned to the state Legislature of Maine, his political friends leaving him no leisure from political life, and allowing him no respite from political honors. In 1848, on the death of John Fairfield, United States Senator, he was elected to fill the vacancy, in the the upper house of Congress; and in 1851 was re-elected for the full term in the same body. In 1854, Mr. Hamlin formally left the Democratic party, with which he had acted so long; not approving of the Nebraska Bill, he felt it to be his duty to sever the political ties which he had hitherto acknowledged. Since then, he has been a firm and consistent Republican. His conduct at that time was the subject of great discussion, and contributed materially to the establishment of the Republican party in Maine. It received the complete endorsement of his native State. In 1857, having been elected Governor of Maine, he resigned his seat in the Senate, and took the oath of inauguration as Governor on the same day, January 7, 1857. On the 16th of the same month he was re-elected United States Senator for six years, and resigned the office of Governor on the 20th

of February, 1857. This peculiar heaping of honors upon him was looked upon by those who conferred them (the people and the Legislature), and by him who received them, as the reward of his behavior in 1854, and as an indication of the complete satisfaction that behavior had afforded the Republicans of Maine. Mr. Hamlin's term in the Senate has not yet expired; he is now a member of the Committee on Commerce, and on the District of Columbia. His abilities are solid rather than brilliant; his talent executive rather than oratorical. His integrity is undoubted, his manners dignified, his character in every way eminently respectable. His nomination has been received by his party with complete satisfaction; it was accomplished on the second ballot.

On the evening of the 19th of May, the day after the nominations at Chicago were made, a serenade was offered Mr. Hamlin by the Republican Association of Washington, on which occasion the candidate for the Vice Presidency made the following remarks:

FELLOW-CITIZENS: Sympathizing with you in the principles which have united us, I am happy to greet you on this occasion. I am pleased to mingle my thoughts with yours in that tribute which you pay to a common cause.

You have come, my friends, for the purpose of congratulating each other upon the result of the action of our friends who have met in council at Chicago, the communication of whose decision has come to us over the telegraphic wires. Unsolicited, unexpected, and undesired, the nomination has been conferred upon me. Unsolicited as it was, I accept it, with the responsibilities which attach to it—in the earnest and ardent hope that the cause, which is superior to men, shall receive no detriment at my hands. You are here to pay tribute to that man who is to bear your standard on to what we hope and believe will be a triumphant victory. You are here to pay a tribute to that young giant of the West, who comes from that region where the star of empire has already culminated. You come to pay a tribute to that man who is not only the representative man of your principles, but a representative man of the people;—that man who is identified in all your interests by his early associations in life, who sympathizes justly and truly with the labor of all this broad land, himself inured to toil. Capacious, comprehensive, a statesman incorruptible, a man over whom the shade of suspicion has never cast a reproach.

But what is the mission, my friends, that is committed to our hands? It is to bring back your Government to the position, to bring back the principles and practices of its fathers and founders, and administer in the

light of their wisdom. It is to purge the Government of its corruptions, compared with which those in any other administration pale into utter insignificance. It is to maintain the integrity of the Union, with the just rights of all the States; and while the just rights of all the States are maintained, it is also to maintain that States shall not interfere in territories outside of their own jurisdiction. And it is to give new aids to commerce across the trackless ocean—it is to foster and give new life to the industry of this broad land.



THE NEW NOVELS.

The Kellys and the O'Kellys.

A new novel by the author of "Doctor Thorne." Reprinted from the London edition. One vol., 12mo., muslin. Price \$1.25.

*** The enormous circulation in England last year of "Doctor Thorne," and the many thousand copies sold in this country, is sufficient guaranty of the excellence of this author's novels. The "Kellys and the O'Kellys" is a reprint of one of his best.

The Adventures of Verdant Green.

From the London edition. Three vols. in one. Nearly 200 humorous illustrations. 12mo., muslin. Price, \$1.00.

*** This capital volume is published from the English stereotype plates, with all the illustrations. It is one of the best stories of English university life, and has already reached, in London, the enormous circulation of 90,000 copies.

Romance of a Poor Young Man.

By OCTAVE FEUILLET. Translated from the seventh Paris edition. One vol., 12mo., muslin. Price \$1.00.

*** The *New York Tribune* says: "This book has been hailed by both French and English critics, as perhaps the most striking and admirable work of fiction, that appeared in any country during the year 1858. Indeed, since 'Jane Eyre' startled the novel-reading world, we hardly remember any production of the kind, which for beauty and interest can be compared with this."

(ORDER THE MUSLIN EDITION.)

These books are sold by booksellers everywhere, and will be sent by mail, postage free, on receipt of the price, by

RUDD & CARLETON, Publishers,

130 Grand Street, New York.

The Habits of Good Society.

One large 12mo. volume. Reprinted from the London Edition. Handsomely bound in cloth. Price, \$1.25.

An interesting and readable hand-book for ladies and gentlemen. With thoughts, hints, and anecdotes, concerning social observations, nice points of taste and good manners, and the art of making oneself agreeable. A more sensible book on good breeding has rarely appeared; a more entertaining and interesting one, never. It abounds in wit, anecdote, and good taste; the whole tempered by sound common sense, and rendered fascinating by a pleasant and agreeable style. It is a work that will amuse and at the same time impart many useful lessons to all who claim to move in good society. So rapid has been its sale in this country that a *fifth edition* has already been called for. The *New Orleans Bulletin* says: "The reader will find this excellent book brimful of humor and good sense. It is by far the best, wittiest, and most interesting book on manners we have ever seen."

ALSO, JUST PUBLISHED,

The Curiosities of Natural History.

By FRANCIS T. BUCKLAND, M.D., Oxford. Reprinted from the fourth London Edition. One large 12mo. vol. Muslin. Price, \$1.25.

The Boston Pilot, in speaking of this volume, says: "It is one of the most interesting books on natural history that we have ever seen. It is a work of the son of the late celebrated Geologist, and is a novelty among books of its kind. It is written in a clear straightforward style, which will be grateful to the general reader from its unscientific character. It is more like the conversation of a good humored and diligent observer of nature, who is thoroughly versed in his favorite science and in general literature, than a made up book. If anybody wishes to know more about natural history than he ever did before, he has only to read this entertaining volume."

* * *These books are sold by all Booksellers, and will be sent by mail, postage free, on receipt of the price, by*

RUDD & CARLETON, Publishers,

130 Grand Street, New York.

JUST PUBLISHED.

LOVE (L'AMOUR).

*Translated from the original French of M. J. MICHELET.
By J. W. PALMER, M.D. One vol. 12mo., elegantly
bound in muslin. Price, \$1 00.*

The successful sale of this remarkable volume has been the subject of amazement everywhere. Newspapers are out with long reviews of it; copious extracts are filling the columns of most of our journals; critics are by the ears upon the morality and tendency of its tone—hence the volume is in its *twenty-sixth* edition. The *New Orleans Picayune* says: "This remarkable book has produced an impression upon the reading public almost without parallel in late years. Such audacity and delicacy, such rigorous analysis and tender sentiment were scarcely ever before so artistically and effectively combined. It is a volume of naked truth on a delicate subject—the truest, boldest, tenderest plea ever made in behalf of woman."

ALSO UNIFORM WITH THE ABOVE.

WOMAN (LA FEMME)

*Translated from the French of MICHELET (author of
"L'Amour). By J. W. PALMER, M.D. One vol. 12mo.,
elegantly bound in muslin. Price, \$1 00.*

The sale of this very remarkable new work by Michelet (author of "Love," *L'Amour*) has more than realized the anticipations of its publishers. Many thousand copies have been eagerly bought, and its circulation will no doubt equal that of its predecessor, "Love," the success of which has been characterized as the great fact of the publishing year. The *Boston Saturday Gazette*, says: "The thousands and tens of thousands who have read and re-read Michelet's 'Love,' will need no urging to purchase his new work, 'Woman.' It is as philosophical, as instructing, and as fascinating. * * * A book every man and every woman ought to read. It cannot fail to interest, and we firmly believe it cannot fail to benefit. We have no words for it but those of honest praise."

* * * *These books are sold by all Booksellers, and will be
sent by mail, postage free, on receipt of the price by*

RUDD & CARLETON, Publishers,

130 Grand Street, New York.

JUST PUBLISHED.

**THE LIFE TRAVELS AND BOOKS OF
ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT.**

With an Introduction by BAYARD TAYLOR. One handsome 12mo. volume, elegantly bound in muslin, with an original steel portrait. Price, \$1.25.

Containing a full account of his Life from birth to death; a picturesque summary of his Travels and Adventures in the New World and Asia; biographical Sketches of his relatives and literary associates; a complete resumé of his various works, with extracts from the most important ones; a lucid statement of his achievements in all departments of science, &c. *The Philadelphia Press* says:—"The Life Travels and Books of Alexander von Humboldt has already become a 4th edition. * * * It is entertaining as a romance, and contains the cream of Humboldt's books. * * * The plan of the work is excellent. The biography is combined with the wanderings of his life, and the essence of numerous volumes is here artistically condensed into one. A more readable and instructive book has not lately issued."

ALSO, UNIFORM WITH ABOVE

**THE PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE OF
ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT.**

A copyright translation, from the original German, by FRIEDERICH KAPP. One large 12mo. volume, bound in muslin, with Steel Portrait. Price, \$1.25.

* * The publication of these Letters in Germany has created a remarkable sensation in Europe, and will create a profound interest wherever the book is read. Since its announcement, the chief curiosity to see it. Baron Humboldt, who was undoubtedly the most thoroughly accomplished savant of the age, and an absolutely learned man that ever lived had his own private feelings and opinions of men and things, which he very freely expressed in these off-hand private letters to his friends. They are full of anecdote, gossip, and scandal; out-spoken, never sparing, dealing blows in every (even the highest) direction. Among this correspondence will be found curious letters on public and private interests, from many of the most celebrated and prominent men in every department of Literature, State Science, and Art.

* * These books are sold by all booksellers, and will be sent by mail, postage free, on receipt of the price, by

RUDD & CARLETON, Publishers,
No. 130 Grand Street, New York.